US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, & Publications
3-1-2016

Old and New Insurgency Forms
Robert J. Bunker Dr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
Robert J. Bunker Dr., Old and New Insurgency Forms ( US Army War College Press, 2016),
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/426

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, & Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

The United States Army War College
The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service
at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application
of Landpower.
The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates
who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently,
it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders
and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage
in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving
national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national
security and strategic research and analysis to influence
policy debate and bridge the gap between military
and academia.

CENTER for
STRATEGIC
LEADERSHIP

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

The Center for Strategic Leadership contributes
to the education of world class senior leaders,
develops expert knowledge, and provides solutions
to strategic Army issues affecting the national
security community.
The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
provides subject matter expertise, technical review,
and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability
operations concepts and doctrines.
The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic
leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom
grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and
by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in
the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional
expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security,
resource management, and responsible command.
The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires,
conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use
to support the U.S. Army, educate an international
audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

i

STRATEGIC
STUDIES
INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War
College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related
to national security and military strategy with emphasis on
geostrategic analysis.
The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct
strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:
• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined
employment of military forces;
• Regional strategic appraisals;
• The nature of land warfare;
• Matters affecting the Army’s future;
• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,
• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.
Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern
topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of
Defense, and the larger national security community.
In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics
of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings
of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip
reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.
The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the
Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army
participation in national security policy formulation.
iii

Strategic Studies Institute
and
U.S. Army War College Press

OLD AND NEW INSURGENCY
FORMS
Robert J. Bunker

March 2016

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and
U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full
academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified
information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent
official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to
offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,
Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be
copyrighted.

v

*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should
be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn
Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War
College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded
free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of certain
reports may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last
by placing an order on the SSI website. Check the website for
availability. SSI publications may be quoted or reprinted in
part or in full with permission and appropriate credit given
to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army
War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address:
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War
College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update
the national security community on the research of our analysts,
recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides
a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you
are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the
SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-721-9

vi

FOREWORD
This monograph develops a typology of old and
new insurgency forms derived from a comprehensive
review of the writings of insurgency theorists along
with the inclusion of a number of schema offered by
terrorism scholars. The work is unique in that no prior
military theoretical efforts have been undertaken to
analyze and synthesize the post-Cold War insurgency
form writings that have emerged over the last 2 decades. It is apropos that these writings were greatly
influenced by Strategic Studies Institute efforts dating back to the early-1990s—initially pioneered by Dr.
Steven Metz, our present Director of Research—that
have now come full circle with their integration in this
work.
The monograph contains an introduction, sections
on defining insurgency, terrorism as insurgency indications and warnings, review of insurgency typologies, a proposed insurgency typology with legacy,
contemporary, emergent and potential forms, and the
strategic implications for U.S. defense policy, as well
as five tables, and an endnotes section. The effort by
the author, Dr. Robert J. Bunker, a past Minerva Chair
at our institution, benefits from his past work in the
terrorism and insurgency fields of study and ongoing
collaborative scholarship in articulating new forms of
insurgency—especially its criminalized form now evident in Mexico—that are emerging.
While primarily a theoretical analysis, this work
has direct implications for U.S. national security and
strategy. It provides insights into the evolving nature
of insurgency and its numerous variants as well as offering recommendations for U.S. policymakers. The
strategic implications for the Department of Defense
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for each form that has been identified are discussed
as well as suggested U.S. responses. For this reason,
the Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press hopes this monograph will be of great interest to key leaders in the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense as well as senior U.S. Government
policymakers, scholars, and theorists focusing on
insurgency studies themselves.
		
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
While the study of insurgency extends well over
100 years and has its origins in the guerrilla and small
wars of the 19th century and beyond, almost no cross
modal analysis—that is, dedicated insurgency form
typology identification—has been conducted. Until the end of the Cold War, the study of insurgency
focused primarily on separatist and Marxist derived
forms with an emphasis on counterinsurgency practice aimed at those forms rather than on identifying
what differences and interrelationships existed. The
reason for this is that the decades-long Cold War
struggle subsumed many diverse national struggles
and tensions into a larger paradigm of conflict—a free,
democratic, and capitalist West versus a totalitarian,
communist, and centrally planned East.
With the end of the Cold War and the resulting
ideological and economic implosion of the Soviet
Union, post-Cold War insurgency typologies began to
emerge because a need existed to understand where
this component of the new global security environment was heading. Over 2 decades of research and
writing have been focused on this endeavor by what
is a relatively small number of insurgency practitioners and/or theorists. In addition, the works of some
contemporary terrorism scholars are also relevant to
this topical area of focus.
For this monograph to identify what can be considered new forms of insurgency that are developing,
an appreciation for and understanding of earlier insurgency forms must also be articulated. With these
thoughts in mind, this monograph will initially discuss
what an insurgency is and some Western viewpoints
on it, describe how terrorism analysis can potentially
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serve an indications and warnings (I&W) function,
provide a literature review of the post-Cold War insurgency typologies that exist, create a proposed insurgency typology divided into legacy, contemporary,
and emergent and potential insurgency forms, and
finally provide strategic implications for U.S. defense
policy as they relate to each of these forms. The work
will also utilize a number of tables for organizational
purposes and an endnotes section for scholarly citation requirements.
Pertaining to the insurgency and terrorism literature reviews conducted in this manuscript, the following terrorism and insurgency forms—form name(s),
author(s), and year of publication—were analyzed in
creating the final forms typology.
Terrorism Forms.
• Anarchist, anti-colonial, new-left, religious
extremism (Rapoport, 2001)
• Utopian vision (Kaplan, 2007)
• Ethnic, religious, ideological (Schnabel and
Gunaratna, 2006, 2015)
Insurgency Forms.
• Commercial and spiritual (Metz, 1993)
• People’s war, Cuban-style focquismo, urban
insurrection (Metz, 1993)
• Defensive (Cable, 1993 in Metz, 1995)
• Reactionary, subversive (camouflaged) (Metz,
1995)
• Liberation, separatist, reform, warlord
(Clapham, 1998)
• Apolitical (Sloan, 1999)
• Economic (Thom, 1999)
xii

• Resource-based (Cilliers, 2000)
• Revolutionary warfare, wars of national liberation, urban, superpower (Beckett, 2001)
• Globalized Islamist (Kilcullen, 2004)
• National, liberation (Metz and Millen, 2004)
• Anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist (reactionary-traditionalist), apocalyptic-utopian, secessionist, reformist, preservationist, commercial
(Metz, 1993; O’Neill, 2005)
• Virtual (Thomas, 2006)
• Virtual (Hammes, 2007 in Metz, 2007)
• Criminal (Sullivan, 2008)
• Violent new religious movements (Lauder,
2009)
• Urban (Sullivan and Elkus, 2009)
• Resource control (Tarr, 2011)
• Revolution, separatism, resistance (Jones, 2011)
• Virtual (Sloan, 2011)
• Plutocratic (Bunker, 2011)
• Proto-state, nonpolitical, state destruction
(Metz, 2012)
• Urban (Kilcullen, 2013)
• Chinese state (Jones and Johnson, 2013)
• Singularity (Rectenwald, 2013)
• Radical Christian (Metz, 2015)
Derived from this analysis, the following insurgency forms with their starting dates in ( ) have been
identified as well as the strategic implications of each
form for U.S. defense policy.
Legacy Insurgency Forms.
Anarchist (1880s). Generally violent, anarchism has
only been viewed as a form of terrorism (Rapoport,
2001) because the end state sought is governmental—
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even state—destruction. No replacement government
or seizure of the state is being attempted nor is any
form of subversion or co-option of state institutions or
the parallel building of a shadow state taking place.
Still, O’Neill (2005) designates this as an insurgency
form and the insurgency outcome of state-destruction
exists in a later typology created by Metz (2012).
Strategic implications: None. This legacy insurgency form is an anachronism with the threat potentials
downgraded to that of sporadic periods of local unrest being generated by protesters outside of political
conventions and financial summits and characterized
by vandalism, aggravated assault, and arson. This is
solely a U.S. domestic law enforcement issue focusing
on riot control, investigation of criminal activities, and
limited counterterrorism response. No U.S. military
response is required.
Separatist—Internal and External (1920s). This insurgency form encompasses both separation from
local authority—such as the original Irish Republican Army (IRA) gaining Irish independence from the
United Kingdom in 1921—and the separation from
foreign authority as took place in numerous regions
during the decolonial period after the Second World
War. Numerous theorists have identified this insurgency form, ranging from Cable’s (1993) defensive
articulation through a number of others into Jones’s
(2011) separatist and resistance types.
Strategic implications: Limited. This insurgency
form now takes place only sporadically and to some
extent has been replaced by more traditional secession ballot initiatives as have or may be seen in the
future as taking place in Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders,
and other locales. Still, the insurgencies of the 1990s
that took place in the former Yugoslavia and the more
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recent secession of South Sudan in 2011 suggest this
legacy form has not faded away. A possible U.S. military response may be required depending on the specific international incident taking place.
Maoist People's (1930s). The most identifiable insurgency form is derived from Mao Zedong’s principles
found in his 1937 work, On Guerrilla Warfare. This form,
also known as “people’s war,” utilizes peasant armies
that are drawn upon for an integrated and protracted
politico-military phase strategy of eventual state takeover. A shadow or proto-state is created in parallel to
the pre-existing one being targeted for elimination.
This form has been identified by Metz (1993) as people’s war, by Beckett (2001) as revolutionary warfare,
by O’Neill (2005) as egalitarian, and Schnabel and Gunaratna (2006; 2015) as ideological.
Strategic implications: None. This legacy insurgency form is defunct. No U.S. military response is
required.
Urban Left (Late-1960s). This insurgency form has
been identified by a number of theorists and, as previously mentioned, is a continuation of earlier Marxist
politico-military concepts with a more urbanized emphasis. Peasants no longer fight in the countryside or
surround cities—their successors now engage in terrorist tactical actions within those cities. Metz’s (1993)
urban insurrection—devoid the Iranian experience,
Beckett’s (2001) urban and superpower based Soviet
proxy component, Rapoport’s (2001) new-left, and Schnabel and Gunaratna’s (2006; 2015) ideological (which
spans the earlier Marxist form and this one) all address
this form.
Strategic implications: None to limited. This legacy
insurgency form appears to be defunct, therefore, no
U.S. military response is required. However, the pro-
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motion of such potentials by the Bolivarian alliance
exists and could be facilitated by Russian, Iranian and
Hezbollah, and/or Chinese support. Still, if this insurgency form should reappear, the impact is estimated
to be limited. It would require varying U.S. Government agency involvement based on a situational
response.
Contemporary Insurgency Forms.
Radical Islamist (1979). The Islamic Revolution in
Iran in 1979 and the ensuing 444-day U.S. Embassy
hostage crisis ushered in a new insurgency form derived from the perception that mosque and state are
inexorably intertwined. The radical Islamist form has
two variants—one Shia and the other Sunni based—
and stems from the fact that Islam never underwent a
historical reformation which ushered in secular political thought and a separation of the spheres of church
(or mosque) and state. Scholars recognizing this insurgency form are Metz (1995) reactionary, Rapoport
(2001) religious extremism, Kilcullen (2004) globalized
Islamist, O’Neill (2005) reactionary-traditionalist, and
Schnabel and Gunaratna (2006; 2015) religious.
Strategic implications: Significant. Groups involved include Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic
State. Of all the presently active insurgency forms, this
one has the most significant impact on U.S. defense
policy as witnessed by the years of deployments to
Afghanistan and Iraq and the ongoing operations in
Syria, Yemen, and numerous other locales. This insurgency form requires either federal law enforcement or
the military (typically) as the designated lead. An allof-government approach is required to mitigate and
defeat this insurgency form which possesses a terrorism component—utilizing both large scale and lone
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wolf attacks—representing a direct threat to the U.S.
homeland.
Liberal Democratic (1989). The removal of the Berlin
Wall in November 1989, the end of Communist rule
in Eastern Europe thereafter, and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 marked
not only the end to the Cold War but also the power
of pluralist uprisings as the Polish Solidarity shipyard
workers have shown. That liberal democracy could
provide the basis for an insurgency form has been
noted by both Beckett (2001), as the American component of the Cold War superpower based conflict, and
also later by O’Neill (2005), more specifically within
his pluralist form designation.
Strategic implications: Mixed (beneficial). This insurgency form should be viewed as an opportunity to
extend democratic values rather than as an actual or
potential threat of some sort to the United States or
its allies. A variety of U.S. Government agencies may
provide indirect and/or direct facilitation of such insurgencies. The one downside of this insurgency form
is unintended second and third order effects—for example, U.S. support to the mostly defunct Free Syrian
Army (FSA) inadvertently strengthened the Islamic
State (IS) by helping to weaken the Assad regime.
Criminal (Early-2000s). Elements and components
of this insurgency form have been projected and identified by numerous scholars: Metz’s (1993) commercial,
Clapham’s (1998) warlord, Sloan’s (1999) apolitical,
Thom’s (1999) economic, Cilliers’s (2000) resourcebased, Tarr’s (2011) resource control, and Metz’s later
(2012) non-political. Of these various articulations,
Sullivan’s (2008) criminal designation—directly derived from Metz’s 1993 perceptions—has become
the dominant one as it relates to the insurgent-like

xvii

activities of the gangs and cartels in Mexico and Latin
America.
Strategic implications: Limited to moderate. Typically, the groups involved in this insurgency form—
Colombian and Mexican cartels, Central American
gangs, and the Italian mafia—are viewed as a law
enforcement concern. However, some of the African
warlords and the more operationally capable cartel
groups, such as Los Zetas and CJNG (Cártel de Jalisco
Nueva Generación), have overmatch capability to any
law enforcement response. For the United States, the
response to this insurgency form requires either federal law enforcement (typically) or the military as the
designated lead. An all-of-government approach is
required to mitigate and defeat this insurgency form
that springs out of Mexico and is bringing corruption
into U.S. border zones along with sporadic incidents
of narco-terrorism.
Plutocratic (2008). Of all of the insurgency forms offered in this monograph, this may be one of the most
contentious. It specifically views the rise of globalized
capital devoid of any ties to the state—in essence,
representative of an emerging form of 21st century
postmodern capitalism—in direct conflict with earlier forms of 20th century state moderated capitalism
promoted by liberal democratic governments. It views
the rise of stateless multinational corporations, and
the global elites (.001% to 1%) they serve as the major
stakeholders, as insider insurgent threats to the international order. This insurgent form serves as a corollary to the preceding criminal form and represents another variant to Metz’s (1993) commercial articulation
postulated by Bunker (2011).
Strategic implications: None presently. The U.S.
military has no current role in the response to the rise
of predatory global capitalism and the emerging “sovxviii

ereign free” entities engaging in it. Rather, varying
governmental agencies with a legalistic and economic
mandate will be required to promote state moderated
capitalist values and laws. Federal law enforcement
agencies will be tasked to support such efforts as they
relate to financial crimes, tax avoidance, and related
offenses.
Emergent and Potential Insurgency Forms.
Blood Cultist (Emergent). The existence of this type
of insurgency form has been recognized by a number of scholars (O’Neill, 2005; Kaplan, 2007; Lauder,
2009) primarily within the last decade and ultimately
represents a fusion of criminality, spirituality, and
barbarism. It is most recognizable with recent Islamic
State activity involving mass ritual beheadings, crucifixions, child rape, and related atrocities and their
“end of days” type of pursuits. Attributes of this insurgency form can also be found with the La Familia
Michoacana (LFM) and Los Caballeros Templarios (The
Knight’s Templars) cartels in Mexico which engage in
Christian cultish behaviors and elements of Los Zetas
and Cartel del Golfo that are involved in extreme forms
of Santa Muerte worship which seek supernatural protection, death magic spells, power, and riches.
Strategic implications: Limited to moderate. This
insurgency form can be viewed as a mutation of either
radical Islam and/or rampant criminality, as found in
parts of Latin America and Africa, into dark spirituality based on cult-like behaviors and activities involving rituals and even human sacrifice. To respond to
this insurgency form, either federal law enforcement
or the military will be the designated lead depending on the specific international incident taking place.
An all-of-government approach will be required to
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mitigate and defeat this insurgency form which has
terrorism (and narco-terrorism) elements that represent direct threats—especially concerning the Islamic
State—to the U.S. homeland.
Neo-urban (Emergent). This emergent insurgency
form is not a resurgence of the old urban left form dating back to the late-1960s that was derived from small
numbers of politicized leftist-leaning urban guerrillas.
Rather, this form is post-modernistic in orientation
with concerns over feral cities and sprawling slums—
such as in Karachi, Rio, Lagos, and Nairobi—controlled by inner city gangs, local militias, organized
crime and private security groups. Theoretically, it
can be considered a kludge of Metz’s commercial (1993)
and urban insurrection (1993) forms updated by means
of Sullivan and Elkus’ urban (2009) and Kilcullen’s urban (2013) focused insurgencies writings. Kilcullen’s
competitive control focus is further indicative of fractured sovereignty and state deconstruction. It is thus
conceptually allied with the neo-Medievalism works
of Hedley Bull (1977), Jorg Friedrichs (2001) and Phil
Williams (2008). This insurgency form has become the
focus of present “megacities issue” studies by U.S.
Army insurgency experts and is highlighted by such
works as the Army Chief of Staff’s Strategic Studies Group/Concept Team’s Megacities and the United
States Army (2014) and William Adamson’s “Megacities and the US Army” published in Parameters (2015).
Strategic implications: Moderate to significant potentials. At its more benign levels of criminality, this
is a law enforcement concern, but when public safety
resources are overwhelmed and internal stability is
threatened it increasingly becomes a military concern.
A major issue is governmental inability to effectively control sprawling slums and the possible role of
gangs, militias, and organized crime as a stabilizing
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and norm inducing force. Of further concern is the
fact that this insurgency form readily has the capacity
to merge with the criminal insurgency form. An allof-government approach is required for megacities
which are in advanced stages of this insurgency form
because it ultimately signifies that urban competitive
control has shifted to informal networks and non-state
entities.
Virtual (Potential; Near to Midterm). Initial thinking
on this potential form solely focused on its being an
adjunct to physical based insurgency. It was simply
viewed as a means of virtual communications—a more
efficient type of “propaganda of the deed” or cyber
levée en masse (form of mobilization)—which was initially discussed by Thomas (2006 and 2007), Hammes
(2007 in Metz), and Betz (2008). The initial “adjunct to
physical insurgency” viewpoint has since been challenged by new perceptions articulated by Sloan (2011).
He sees the virtual realm as its own reality in which
insurgency can now be waged—a view shared by this
author given his past collaborative work with Sloan.
As a result, this potential insurgency form is reflective of a changing 21st century battlefield composed
of dual-dimensional space-time attributes, derived
from humanspace and cyberspace, with its increasing
virtual overlay placed over our physical reality.
Strategic implications: Initially limited but increasing over time. This potential insurgency form spans
a basic criminal or terrorist act (e.g., recruiting and
fundraising for the Islamic State) through increasing
levels of sophistication such as the release of classified
governmental documents (e.g., WikiLeaks), the shutdown of components of a state’s public and private infrastructure, and actual destructive cyberattacks. Ultimately, it may represent an entirely new component

xxi

of insurgency taking place both in cyberspace and
eventually as a component of dual-dimensional (e.g.,
humanspace and cyberspace) operations. An initial response to virtual support of terrorists and insurgents
will need to come from federal law enforcement and
specialized computer forensic and cyber task forces.
More systemic and malicious type attacks, approaching what can be considered virtual insurgency levels,
will result in military and intelligence agency cyber
forces also being utilized for response purposes.
Chinese Authoritarianism (Potentials; Near to Midterm). China is now not only in the process of industrializing, but has been running a massive mercantilistlike trade surplus, and investing in countries across
the world in order to gain access to raw materials and
resources. In addition to China’s Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) and “Belt and Road” initiatives in Asia and within the former lands traversed
by the old Silk Road, it has made significant political
and economic investment inroads into both Africa
and Latin America. The insurgency potentials identified by Jones and Johnson (2013) can thus been seen
vis-à-vis the U.S. “Pivot to Asia” and the ensuing engagement and containment strategy being directed at
China. Steven Metz has voiced an opposing view on
the viability of such a potential insurgency form.
Strategic implications: Significant potentials.
Given that China is rising as a great power and now
has global economic and political interests and reach,
this proposed insurgency form could in the near to
midterm represent a threat to U.S. national security.
However, significant barriers to implementation exist stemming from a lack of a transnational ideology
that can solidify ties to insurgents. Ongoing monitoring and analysis by the intelligence community of
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such threat potentials is warranted for strategic early
warning purposes. Additionally, behavioral and environmental shaping by the Department of State and
Department of Defense to promote desirable futures
should be implemented.
Cyborg and Spiritual Machine (Potentials; Long Term/
Science Fiction-like). This insurgency form can be considered a “blue sky” scenario, but must still must be
considered for its potentially dire implications. This
insurgency form is derived from the merging of the
spiritual (Metz, 1993) and plutocratic (Bunker, 2011)
forms and has also been raised in neo-Marxist singularity form thinking (Rectenwald, 2013). Such concerns have been the lore of science fiction for decades
and can be found in Isaac Asimov’s “Three Laws of
Robotics” meant to protect humanity from such threats
through the dystopian Terminator series in which the
self-aware Skynet computer system targets humanity
for eradication.
Strategic implications: None presently. This proposed insurgency form is viewed as having long-term
threat potentials, although it is presently science fiction-like in nature. The appropriate U.S. response is
achieved through the Defense Science Board monitoring of technologies related to cybernetic implants and
strong artificial intelligence and the shaping of policies
and laws that promote democratic and constitutional
values.
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OLD AND NEW INSURGENCY
FORMS
The United States Army is still in a process of
drawing down from over a decade of deployments to
Afghanistan and Iraq, primarily focused on stability
and support operations (SASO), counter-insurgency
operations (COIN), and related mission sets. Compared to earlier soldier and contractor commitments
and periodic surges, the present numbers are relatively low with about 10,000 personnel in Afghanistan
and slightly over 3,000 personnel in Iraq.1 However,
new deployments are possible due to the recent battlefield successes and territorial acquisitions of the
Islamic State (IS) in Iraq, Syria, Libya and its expansion and takeover of the old al-Qaeda global terrorist
and insurgent network. As a result, the 9/11 triggered
war—what David Kilcullen links to al-Qaeda and explanatory models related to wars of globalization, globalized insurgency, Islamic civil war, and asymmetric
warfare2—is far from over, with IS likely representative of a next generation insurgent organizational
upgrade.
Still, the U.S. Army and other services have found
themselves somewhat in a “strategic pause,” albeit one
partially induced by deployment fatigue, large personnel and program reductions, and a scaled-down
pivot to Asia directed at an authoritarian China. It is
during this pause—with new threats making themselves known, such as the Russian seizure of parts of
Ukraine via its proxies and non-uniformed military
and the ongoing narco conflict in Mexico and other
Latin American states—that reflection is warranted
as it relates to the early-21st century global security
environment. This is an environment that appears to
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be seeing a rise in fragile and failed states, along with
concurrent increased levels of criminality, extremism, terrorism, and barbarism taking place, and one
that is ultimately linked to what can be theorized as
new forms of insurgency that have been and are now
emerging.
While the study of insurgency extends well over
100 years and has its origins in the guerrilla and small
wars of the 19th century and beyond,3 almost no crossmodal analysis—that is, dedicated insurgency form
typology identification—has been conducted. Until the end of the Cold War, the study of insurgency
focused primarily on separatist and Marxist derived
forms with an emphasis on counterinsurgency practice aimed at those forms rather than on identifying
what differences and interrelationships existed. The
reason for this is that the decades-long Cold War
struggle subsumed many diverse national struggles
and tensions into a larger paradigm of conflict—a free,
democratic, and capitalist West versus a totalitarian,
communist, and centrally planned East.
With the end of the Cold War and the resulting
ideological and economic implosion of the Soviet
Union, post-Cold War insurgency typologies began to
emerge because a need existed to understand where
this component of the new global security environment was heading. Over 2 decades of research and
writing have been focused on this endeavor by what
is a relatively small number of insurgency practitioners and/or theorists. In addition, the works of some
contemporary terrorism scholars are also relevant to
this topical area of focus.
For this monograph to identify what can be considered new forms of insurgency that are developing, an appreciation for and understanding of earlier
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insurgency forms must also be articulated. With these
thoughts in mind, this monograph will initially discuss
what an insurgency is and some Western viewpoints
on it, describe how terrorism analysis can potentially
serve an indications and warnings (I&W) function,
provide a literature review of the post-Cold War insurgency typologies that exist, create a proposed
insurgency typology divided into legacy, contemporary, and emergent and potential insurgency forms,
and finally provide strategic implications for U.S.
defense policy as they relate to each of these forms.
The monograph will also utilize a number of tables for
organizational purposes and an endnotes section for
scholarly citation requirements.
		
DEFINING INSURGENCY
Before attempting to analyze the terrorism and
insurgency literature as it relates to insurgency form
identification, a short discussion of what an insurgency is and concepts related to it will be provided.
The basic U.S. definition of an insurgency per the May
2014 Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies is as follows:
. . . the organized use of subversion and violence to
seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.
Insurgency can also refer to the group itself (JP [Joint
Publication] 3-24).4

Of importance is the stipulation that both elements
of subversion and violence are required to characterize an insurgency. Subversion on its own—derived
from co-option and corruption—can be viewed as an
element of big city political machines and parasitical
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organized crime (along with minimal levels of criminal violence). The use of violence on its own, especially that which is conventional military in nature, is
more indicative of warfare waged by states.
This present definition, however, is insufficient in
that “political control” is a generic term and is devoid
of strategic meaning. One of the earlier FM 3-24 drafts
included the following wording—“. . . system of government or existing social order” being overthrown,
changed or undermined.5 This has more utility for our
definitional purposes because it can help to illustrate
that a Westphalian state—or what is left of it in a failed
state context—is the strategic prize being targeted by
an insurgent force. Such a Westphalian state—with
full sovereign rights— primarily exists within physical
(human) space and can be characterized by the components of: a) ideology; b) government; c) economy;
d) military; e) populace; and, f) religion (in a secularized context) and the ensuing relationships that exist
between them.6 Each of these components are defined
by the Oxford Dictionaries as follows:7
Ideology: A system of ideas and ideals, especially one
which forms the basis of economic or political theory
and policy.
Government: The group of people with the authority
to govern a country or state.
Economy: The state of a country or region in terms
of the production and consumption of goods and
services and the supply of money.
Military: The armed forces of a country.
Populace: The people living in a particular country or
area.
Religion: The belief in and worship of a superhuman
controlling power, especially a personal God or gods.
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The relationships of these components create hybrid governmental/social order combinations. For
example, the relationship between ideology and economy can be said to result in the prevailing “political
economy” that exists. Military and populace relationships, on the other hand, result in determining “soldier
types” (conscript, professional, etc.) while ideology
and military relationships help to define “civil-military relations.” These relationships represent state
and societal bonds that are vulnerable to insurgent,
and also terrorist, attacks derived from concepts of
disruptive targeting.8
A modernist view of insurgency, one subscribed
to by the U.S. Army, is grounded in Clausewitzian
thinking and accepts that the Westphalian state represents the dominant form of “social and political organization” in existence. The modernist view further
holds that the “liberal democratic state” with a strong
middle class, upward social mobility, a separation of
church and state, the enfranchisement of women, and
the personal liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights
and Constitution is the most preferable and legitimate
form of Westphalian state. Steven Metz has called this
“the orthodox conceptualization,” derived from Western history and its tradition of enlightened politics that
have seen the state shift from a parasitical form (for
the benefit of aristocrats and the elite) to one based on
a social contract and the consent of the governed.9
The populations of these Westphalian states are
viewed from an inherent Western bias and said to
be swayable via the provision of goods and services
since they operate under a market logic of value optimization. Politics are thus consistent within a rational
choice model. Derived from this orientation, the solution to the threat of insurgency is the development
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of state and societal institutions so that they resemble
Western liberal democratic states and cultures.10 Criticisms of this logic range from an adherence to a naive
ethnocentrism to a slightly more ominous worldview
reflective of Kipling’s old 1899 poem, “The White
Man’s Burden,”11 though with 19th century colonization now replaced by 21st century replication of the
Western body politic. Regardless of the perspective,
modern Army counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine is
solidly Western state centric in orientation and has
both benefited and suffered as a result. Detrimental
examples include the contemporary downplaying of
spirituality and religion as a fundamental motivator
of non-Western tribal based societies and the earlier
body count metrics utilized during the Vietnam era.
On the positive side, insurgent forces typically have
little hope of generating (much less sustaining) conventional land power capabilities in the face of overwhelming U.S. air superiority.12
TERRORISM AS INSURGENCY I&W
Some mention should also be made of terrorism
vis-à-vis insurgency since terrorism may lead to insurgency and also since an insurgency may utilize
terrorism as one of its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The U.S. Army definition of terrorism is
derived from the Joint definition and is as follows:
The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to
instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or
other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit
of goals that are usually political.13
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While a continuum and at times an overlap between terrorism and insurgency exists, the literature
has a tendency to create an impermeable firebreak between them. This is due to theorist and practitioner
specialization, commonly referred to as the “tyranny
of the stove pipe,” that is illustrative of our hierarchical government institutions.14 Furthermore, terrorism
scholars will not typically consider terrorist acts subordinate in importance to insurgent campaigns. They
would argue, and many Western citizens would likely
agree, that the 9/11 attacks in New York, Washington,
and Pennsylvania, and the 7/7 attack in London are
of greater significance than a change of government
in a small African state or other remote locale. From
this perspective, the terrorist potentials of al-Qaeda,
rather than its potential for seizing control of states,
would represent the greater magnitude threat to be focused upon in their investigations.15 The adherence to
such a position by terrorism scholars can be maddening for insurgency scholars, since the logical conclusion of evolved terrorist groups is to achieve insurgent
end states, but is understandable. If we move beyond
this artificial separation of these fields of study and
their inherent biases, it can be seen that incidents
and patterns of terrorism may serve to provide I&W
about forms of insurgency that have, are, and will be
developing.
An example of this potential I&W function can be
seen in David Rapoport’s four waves of international
terrorism published in 2001.16 These waves are each
projected to last for about 40 to 45 years, may have
overlaps with one another, and are said to be based
on some sort of precipitating event.17 The first wave is
that of anarchism and spans the period from the 1880s
to the 1920s. The goal of such terrorists was to bring
about the destruction of government and liberate
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individuals from the shackles of artificial human convention. “Propaganda of the deed” by means of assassination, via the bomb (dynamite) and the gun, were
dominant along with the use of bank robbery for fundraising purposes. Groups engaging in this form of
terrorism included the Narodnaya Volya (The People’s
Will), Hunchaks, Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organization, Young Bosnia, and the Serbian Black
Hand.18
The second wave is anti-colonial or nationalistic in
character. This type of terrorism spanned the 1920s
to the 1960s. The goal was to establish nationalistic
governments in place of European colonial administrations that exploited the local inhabitants. The basic
tactics were to eliminate the police first and then engage in hit and run raids on troops to create counteratrocities to increase social support for the terrorists.
Groups engaging in this form of terrorism included
the Irgun, the IRA, and EOKA.
The third wave is represented by the new-left. It
began in the late-1960s and mostly dissipated by the
1990s which made it much shorter than the normal
wave patterns dictated. Radicalism was combined
with nationalism by many of these revolutionary
groups seeing themselves as being the vanguard
of the masses. Airline hijackings, kidnappings, and
hostage-takings dominated this wave of terrorism.
Groups engaging in this form of terrorism included
the American Weather Underground, West German
RAF, Italian Red Brigades, Japanese Red Army, the
PLO, and the French Action Directe.
The fourth wave is based on religious extremism. This
wave started in 1979 and is expected to continue out to
about 2020 to 2025. The goal of this type of terrorism
is to create religious—predominately Islamic—states
and relies heavily upon suicide bombing techniques.
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Extremist Islamist groups engaging in this form of terrorism include Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda, but
other terrorists including Aum Shinrikyo, Christian
Identity, and Sikh and Jewish radicals are also active.19
A later fifth wave of terrorism emerging in the
1990s, derived from utopian vision (devolving into a
cultist nightmare of horrors), was suggested as an addition to this typology by the religious scholar Jeffrey
Kaplan in 2007. While the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia
represents a precursor group for this proposed wave,
the Lord’s Resistance Army that arose in Northern
Uganda represents a full-fledged example. Other
terrorist groups that could also possibly exist in this
wave are the Janjaweed fighters of Darfur, factions of
the Interahamwe in parts of Central Africa, and components of the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra
Leone. Dominant characteristics of this wave include
rituals of rape and killing, pervasive violence, cultist and apocalyptic religious behavior, child abduction and the fielding of children soldiers.20 See Table
5 in the Appendix for a listing of these five waves of
terrorism.
It is likely that a lag time may exist between the beginning of a terrorist wave and the start of what can be
considered an insurgency form.21 Following this logic,
the emergence of a nationalistic terrorist group in a
European colony would predate that of a nationalistic
insurgent group. Thus, in some instances, terrorists
could be considered proto-insurgents, initially only
able to influence governmental policies and actions,
but not as of yet able to bring about greater and more
significant change to a de facto system of governance
or existing social order. This line of reasoning fits with
a recent example of terrorism scholarship that seeks to
link terrorism and insurgency patterns and activities.
Daniel Byman, in 2008, wrote about proto-insurgen9

cies and how self-styled “armies” composed of weak
terrorist and guerrilla groups found in southern Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and other locales used
terrorism to create insurgencies where none had previously existed.22
As a terrorist group evolves, and gains organizational sophistication, its ability to change and influence the political and social environment in which
it resides will increase. This capacity for increasing
social/environmental modification, as evidenced by
the rise of narcocultura in Mexico, also extends to other
non-state actors, such as drug gangs and cartels that
utilize terrorism along with co-option as the basis of
their tactics. Of course, an insurgent group can also
devolve back into a terrorist group as it loses its organizational capacity to bring about significant governance or social order change.
A great deal of commonality between Rapoport’s
(and Kaplan’s) “terrorism waves” and various “insurgency forms” likely exist—both the terrorist and
insurgency scholars are seeing the same phenomena
taking place—but of course neither discipline is normally paying much attention to the literature of the
other. This can probably be said of transnational organized crime scholars that are seeing some convergence with patterns of terrorism and insurgency in
an increasingly globalized world.23 The lesson learned
for insurgency theorists and practitioners is that the
terrorism studies literature may have some very real
indications and warnings value that can and should
be capitalized upon when constructing insurgency
forms.
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REVIEW OF INSURGENCY TYPOLOGIES
This historical review of post-Cold War insurgency
typologies will begin with the seminal 1993 work by
Steven Metz titled, The Future of Insurgency. In about a
half-dozen or so pages within that work Metz lays out
the conceptual basis of both commercial and spiritual
insurgency projections. These insurgency forms are
highlighted below via direct quotes from Metz’s paper.24 Commercial insurgency is described as follows:
When the discontented define personal meaning
by material possessions rather than psychic fulfillment, they create the environment for commercial
insurgency.
Commercial insurgency is a quasi-political distortion
of materialism.
The quickest and easiest path to material possessions
and the satisfaction they appear to bring is crime. And,
since the discontented of the Third World feel little attachment to the dominant system of values in their
societies anyway, moral restraints on criminal activity
are limited.
In this psychological context, commercial insurgency
is essentially widespread and sustained criminal activity with a proto-political dimension that challenges
the security of the state. In the modern word, its most
common manifestation is narco-insurgency, although
it may also be based on other forms of crime, especially smuggling. The defining feature is expansion
of the criminal activity into a security threat, especially in the hinterlands where government control is
limited.25
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The core regions in which this form of insurgency may
arise are Latin America with its endemic organized
crime related to narcotics trafficking and smuggling
and the Golden Triangle area of Myanmar, Thailand,
and Laos based on narcotics production. Moving on to
spiritual insurgency, a description of it is as follows:
Spiritual insurgency is the evolutionary descendent of
traditional revolution.
What will distinguish many post-Cold War spiritual
insurgencies is an explicit linkage to the search for
meaning. Anomie . . . the desire for a more broadbased sense of fulfillment rather than the simpler
needs-based motives of past popular uprisings will
drive insurgents.
At least two psychological factors undergird the relationship of insurgency and the search for meaning.
One is the linkage between violence and liberation
observed by Fanon. Participation in political violence
is a spiritually liberating event by someone who feels
abused, repressed, or alienated by a socio-political
system. . . . The second factor deals with tolerance of
psychological stimuli. . . . Stimulation becomes like an
addictive drug where ever larger amounts are needed
to satisfy the individual. Violence can provide such
satisfaction. . . .
The essence of spiritual insurgency is rejection of a regime and, more broadly, of the social, economic, and
political system associated with that regime.
One of the crucial interfaces for spiritual insurgency is
between political violence and religion. Development
was long associated with secularization, but throughout the world, the strains of modernization spawned a
religious renaissance. Sometimes this takes militant or
violent forms. . . . Because the notion of justice implies
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punishment, it can be used to validate violence. And all
the world’s great religions deal with justice in some
form. This can be distorted by revolutionary and terrorist leaders, whether Muslim, Christian, or any other
religion, to justify their actions.
For insurgent leaders, the struggle is actually about
power. They want it but do not have it. For their followers, however, the struggle is about personal meaning, the amelioration of discontent, and the punishment of injustice.26

One of the specific regions where this form of insurgency may take hold is said to be the Middle East
with its Shia and Sunni Islamist groups. The notion
of using jihad, derived from its holy war rather than
internal struggle articulation, as an important component of this insurgency form was also noted in
this work.
Along with these two new insurgency forms, Metz
also describes pre-existing insurgency subforms.
These are: people’s war, which is rural and protracted,
built upon the teachings of Mao; Cuban-style focquismo, based on the thinking of Ernesto “Che” Guevara
and the Cuban revolutionary experience; and, urban
insurrection, derived from Russian, Nicaraguan, or Iranian perspectives.27 According to Metz, all represent
broader revolutionary insurgency form variegation,
with that dominant form providing the basis from
which the spiritual insurgency form is emerging. On
the other hand the commercial insurgency form represents a twisted and deviant component of Western
popular and material culture.
Metz, in the 1995 work, “A Flame Kept Burning,”
further touched upon the commercial insurgency
form with the assertion that “. . . commercial insurgen-
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cies probably will not attempt to rule the state but will
seek instead a compliant regime that allows them to
pursue criminal activity unimpeded.”28 Additionally,
he mentions that in 1979 the Iranians were involved in
a reactionary insurgency which, in that instance, was
one where a religious-based group seized power from
a secular, modernizing government. Larry Cable’s
defensive insurgency type, articulated in 1993, is also
mentioned by Metz as essentially a state subgroup
seeking “autonomy or outright independence.”29 Subversive (or camouflaged) insurgency, identified by U.S.
Army doctrine, is also discussed. This insurgency type
appears more TTP than an actual form typology and
“. . . will combine a legitimate, above-ground element
participating in the political process and an underground using political or criminal violence to weaken
or delegitimize the government.”30
In 1998, Christopher Clapham, an African studies scholar, proposed four broad forms of insurgency
based upon the African experience. These are liberation, separatist, reform, and warlord insurgencies.31 A
useful overview of these insurgency groupings is provided by Jakkie Cilliers:
The first, liberation insurgencies, set out to achieve
independence from colonial or minority rule, would
include the independence wars by anti-colonial nationalist groups in the Portuguese colonies of Angola,
Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. A second group,
separatist insurgencies, seeks to represent the aspirations and identities of particular ethnic groups or regions within an existing state, either by seceding from
that state altogether, or else by pressing for some special autonomous status. Virtually all African insurgencies, including the Angolan war, draw to some degree
on ethnic differentiation within the state concerned.
Nearby Zimbabwe is possibly the best example of
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two competing ‘nationalist’ groupings, each reflecting
a specific ethnic base amongst the Shona and Ndebele respectively, although with no overtly separatist agenda. The third group, reform insurgencies, seek
radical reform of the national government, evident in
the cases of the National Resistance Army in Uganda
and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic
Front. The fourth, a new and controversial typology,
is that of warlord insurgencies, which seem directed
more towards a change in leadership and control of
the resources available to the state than a change in
policy, ideology or indeed in patterns of patronage.
In some instances, such as in Liberia, warlords have
gained state control. In neighbouring Sierra Leone, the
Revolutionary United Front appears largely content to
maintain a personal territorial fiefdom separate from
existing state structure and boundaries.32

In 2000, Jakkie Cilliers went on to add a fifth
grouping to Clapham’s typology which is termed resource-based insurgency. This type of insurgency is derived from four factors that have emerged. These are,
according to Cilliers:
. . . the increased importance of the informal polity and
economy in Africa, often in response to inappropriate
economic policies, donor prescriptions, authoritarian
and illegitimate governments or exploitative elites but
also reflecting the lack of institutionalisation of the
state itself.
 he importance of the informal economy and of inforT
mal politics is, of course, facilitated by the continued
weakening and even collapse of a number of African
states about which much has been written.
. . . the effect of the end of the Cold War itself that
has forced sub-state actors to develop alternative resources from those prevalent during the bipolar era.
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. . . increased internationalisation and the apparent
universal salience of economic liberalisation, sometimes referred to as globalisation, has opened up new
avenues for linkages by local actors that can now bypass state control through networks that are neither
geographically located nor internationally regulated.33

In 1999, terrorism scholar Stephen Sloan developed the apolitical insurgencies construct derived from
“. . . the apparent breakdown of the nation-state as the
primary unit of action in the idealized international
community.” This form of insurgency is viewed as a
component of the “privatization of public violence”
being engaged in by narco-terrorists, transnational
terrorists, organized crime, and multinational corporations that seek to control gray-area environments
in order to maximize profits.34 Additionally, in 1999,
William G. Thom came up with a somewhat similar
concept termed economic insurgency which also mimics Steven Metz’s commercial insurgency articulation.
In this instance, it was modeled on the Congo-Zaire
Civil War of 1996-97 in that:
The rise of economic insurgency is in actuality related
to the growth of large-scale, well armed and organized, banditry. Where soldiers are not paid, or otherwise suitably compensated, armed insurgents will
emerge and gravitate toward the control of economic
activity, whether it be stealing by the barrel of the gun,
or a more sophisticated sale of concessions in territory
controlled by the faction.35

Ian Beckett, in the 2001 work, Modern Insurgencies
and Counter-insurgencies, proposes a loose typology
with pre-insurgency eras (historical and resistance/
partisan) followed by Maoist based revolutionary
warfare, formative experiences, wars of national
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liberation (de-colonial), urban insurgency, superpower (Cold War) based insurgency, and an undefined
“mish mash” of post-Cold War insurgency examples
coupled with the typology thinking of some leading
insurgency theorists.36 Of Beckett’s loose typology,
only revolutionary warfare, wars of national liberation,
urban, and superpower based forms of insurgency can
be considered sufficiently defined and developed for
our consideration. The revolutionary war form is based
on classical Maoist peasant based guerilla warfare of
the 1930s and 1940s and its subsequent use in Vietnam and other locales. The wars of national liberation
are said to be from the 1950s through the 1980s and
take place in European colonies with an emphasis on
Malaya, Kenya (Mau Mau), and the rest of Sub-Sahara
Africa.37
The urban insurgency form dates from the late1960s (Marighela’s Minimanual) where a blurring with
modern politically inspired terrorists existed well into
the 1970s. Groups highlighted were the precursor FLN
(National Liberation Front) in Algeria that operated in
the 1950s and 1960s and the later ERP (People’s Revolutionary Army) in Argentina, Tupamaros in Peru,
RAF (Red Army Faction) in West Germany, and the
SLA (Symbionese Liberation Army) in California. The
superpower based form accounts for the proxy nature of
many of the national liberation and urban insurgencies that took place primarily backed by the Soviet
Union. Notable exceptions of U.S. involvement took
place in El Salvador with the Contras and in Afghanistan with the Mujahideen.38 Overlaps between these
insurgency forms, especially with the first three being
evolutionary variants of people’s war over the course
of 50 years from rural to urban and within the context
of local media to global media, should be noted.
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As a follow-on work to his earlier book, Ian Beckett,
in 2005, published a paper titled, “The Future of Insurgency.” In it, he touched upon the shift from rural to
urban insurgency and a combination of the two in the
1980s and 1990s. He then continued his 2001 book discussion of insurgency theorists and went on to highlight the typology thinking of a few more of them.39
Concerning the future of insurgency, “net war,” theorized by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, is mentioned along
with the blurring of distinction between insurgents
and terrorists and international criminals—though no
new emergent insurgency forms are offered.40
In 2004, David Kilcullen published a 72-page Small
Wars Journal essay laying out his initial views on the
emergence of a globalized Islamist insurgency, one primarily being carried out by al-Qaeda, its allies, and affiliates. He discusses this insurgency form in the first
two sections of this work, focusing on the fact that it
is a worldwide Islamist jihad movement and should
be treated as insurgency, not terrorism, and in subsequent sections categorizes it as a systems model of
insurgency that can be disaggregated.41 Later essays
and books, such as The Accidental Guerrilla (2009) and
Counterinsurgency (2010) built upon this initial work.
While this practitioner-theorist has separatist insurgency experience with a post-Cold War Indonesian
focus, his post 9/11 interests initially were primarily
radical Sunni Islamist based and centered on countering this global insurgency form. Because of this
specific counterinsurgency emphasis, his initial contribution to the literature, while significant, is that of
identifying one insurgency form and supporting the
U.S. Government in combating it rather than creating
a more encompassing typology.
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In 2005, Bard O’Neill’s book, Insurgency & Terrorism, however, did just that by detailing a typology
of nine insurgency types. These forms have made
an impact on the literature, being often commented
on, and are identified as: anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, apocalyptic-utopian, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, preservationist, and commercial (based on the
Metz typology). The first five forms are all said to be
“revolutionary” in nature. The anarchist form is contemporary in nature and includes the Black Cells and
Black Hand (Germany) from the 1970s and the 17 November (Greece) organization that is still active. None
of the anarchist movements are said to be of much
significance. The egalitarian form is essentially Marxist in nature with the Huks in the Philippines and the
Vietcong in South Vietnam mentioned as archetypical
examples. This form has greatly ceased to exist, with a
few remnant groups such as the Shining Path in Peru,
the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
in Colombia, and the Front for the Liberation of Nepal.
The traditionalist form is split into two subforms—the
first seeking to restore a recent (or distant past) political system and the second to restore a political system
from the ancient past. Examples of the first subform
are the Nationalists in Spain (1936-1939), the Contras
in the 1980s, and Shia tribesmen in Yemen in the 1960s.
The second subform, termed reactionary-traditionalist,
is composed of Islamic groups such as Hezbollah and
al-Qaeda along with extremist Jewish and Christian
militants.42
The apocalyptic-utopian form is derived from religious cults with political aims and includes Aum Shinrikyo in Japan and the Mahdaviyat (Last Imam) group
in Iran. The last of O’Neill’s revolutionary groups is
the pluralist form, seeking the establishment of pluralist (liberal) democracies. Examples given include the
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African National Congress (Spear of the Nation) from
the 1970s and 1980s in South Africa and the current
NCRI (National Council of Resistance of Iran). The secessionist form seeks to withdraw from a political community (the state) and either establish a brand new one
or merge with another pre-existing one. This form can
also be characterized as wars of national liberation.
Numerous examples are provided for this dominant
insurgent form and include the Confederate States of
America (1861-1865), the National Liberation Front in
Algeria, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the Kosovo Liberation Army in Albania, and the various IRA (Irish
Republican Army) factions in Northern Ireland.43
We can then turn our attention to the reformist form. This form seeks to “. . . target policies that
determine distribution of the economic, psychological, and political benefits that society has to offer.”44
Single issue policy groups such as abortion, animal,
and environmental rights activists clearly fit this typology. Other examples of this insurgency form include
the Zapatistas in Mexico seeking Indian rights, militant
Kurds seeking their ethnic rights, and the neo-Nazi
White Wolves who seek to re-establish white dominance via exclusionary mandates in the United Kingdom. In turn, the preservationist form is reactionary in
nature and is simply status quo seeking. Such “dead
hand of the past” groups include the KKK (Ku Klux
Klan) in the United States, the Afrikaner Resistance
Movement in South Africa, and the Ulster Volunteer
Force and Ulster Defense Association in Northern Ireland. The final insurgency form, derived from Metz’s
commercialist form, has already been covered in an
earlier discussion in this section.45
In addition to the titles and topics previously
discussed, Metz, after a multi-year hiatus related to
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such conceptualizing, wrote a few later works that
specifically discuss insurgency forms. In 2004, in a
work with Raymond Millen, Metz focused on national
and liberation insurgencies. In the first type, a regime
and insurgents are at odds. Concerning the two sides,
“. . . distinctions between the insurgents and the regime are based on economic class, ideology, identity
(ethnicity, race, religion), or some other political factor.”46 In the second type of insurgency, “These pit
insurgents against a ruling group that is seen as outside occupiers (even though they might not actually
be) by virtue of race, ethnicity, or culture. The goal of
the insurgents is to ‘liberate’ their nation from alien
occupation.”47 The second type of insurgency is reminiscent of Clapham’s liberation form described in
1998, but includes both Communist and Islamic based
groups, making it more expansive. Furthermore, the
national insurgency form is a very broad “catch all”
articulation that could be applied to multiple forms
and therefore not useful to this monograph. Gray
areas and permeability between these two forms are
also said to exist. Metz, in a 2007 manuscript, went
on to re-evaluate various aspects of contemporary
insurgency. Of importance is his short description of
“virtual” insurgents/insurgencies that is based on
information sourced to T.X. Hammes in a U.S. Army
TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) and
U.S. Joint Forces Command presentation in January of
that year. This is actually the second mention of this
proposed insurgency form.48 The form also appears
in the writings of Timothy Thomas in both a Summer
2006 IO Sphere article and within a chapter in the 2007
edited book, Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in
the 21st Century.49 In the 2006 work, Thomas’s initial
usage was as follows:
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It is important for planners to begin conceiving a virtual insurgency environment, because it can influence
an operation to the same degree as a radio transmission, by summoning troops to the front. Working on
countercyber capabilities now allows US IO planners
to understand how to neutralize future insurgent
cyber capabilities.50

In the 2007 work, Thomas builds upon the previous quote yet comes to the conclusion that, while the
virtual realm itself exists, virtual insurgencies do not
presently exist—“The conclusion drawn from this
discussion is that virtual elements are the agitators
and propagandists of today’s insurgency much like
pamphlets, journals, and leaflets were at the time of
the French Revolution.”51 David Betz, in 2008, also discusses this potential form—although only as a dimension of traditional insurgency. He provides two main
observations:
The first is that the arrival of social media and near
real-time digital imagery means that the connection between the popular perception of the war and
the physical battlefield is much more immediate and
therefore volatile.
The second is that the ‘virtual dimension’ with which
this paper is concerned is essentially a new form of
‘propaganda of the deed’ in which deeds, violent and
otherwise, act as symbolic and rhetorical tools for
combatants akin to ‘political marketing’ aimed at the
formation of sympathetic support-communities.52

His usage of the term “propaganda of the deed” gives
it more of a terrorism form component—related to
late-19th century anarchism—rather than as an attri-
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bute indicative of physical based insurgency. This terrorism theme is picked up by Stephen Sloan in 2011 in
what is a very important, yet overlooked, theoretical
work and expanded into transdimensional space. He
notes the growing importance of cyberspace in relationship to traditional humanspace and how the virtual dimension is becoming a battleground in its own
right—not just as a method of terrorist communication—in which insurgency can be fought:
The importance of cyberspace, as noted earlier, will
lead to a new form of conflict, not the traditional territorially based insurgency — ‘the war in the shadows’
but a war of abstraction, of images, and the vital role
of perception. We are witnessing the emergence of virtual terrorism and virtual insurgency.53

Sloan’s dual-dimensional thinking had its origins
in an earlier red team and counterterrorism project
on which he had worked with this author. Within
Sloan’s report, cyberspace—linked to 5th dimensional
battlespace perceptions—becomes a domain that can
be fought over just as physical space can be.54
In a 2012 Parameters essay, Metz looked at the
internet and new media and its relationship to the
evolution of insurgency. Of significance is his typology of differing insurgencies derived from the end
states that they hope to achieve. These are known as
proto-state, nonpolitical, and state destruction insurgency
forms. The first form is derived from Maoist people’s
war as the archetype in which a proto-state is created
on the path to the takeover of the pre-existing government. The second form seeks impunity of action
by an organized group—specifically narcos or other
types of criminals—which attempt to hollow out the
state. This form is synonymous with Metz’s commercial
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insurgency form first articulated over 2 decades ago.
Examples of such groups are the FARC in Colombia,
the Shining Path in Peru, and various African movements. The final form, state destruction, is most intriguing. It draws upon network and swarming behaviors and the intentional creation of chaos within a
society. It:
. . . consists of insurgencies that hope to replace the
state, but because they are unable to control significant
territory, approach the goal of destroying the state and
replacing it in a sequential rather than a simultaneous
manner. Their initial focus is destruction.55

This form has typology limitations, because it does
not easily correlate with the other insurgent forms
identified in this literature review. One reason is a
lack of examples provided and the fact that any weak
insurgent movement could utilize this approach.
A variant of Metz’s commercial insurgency form
was then conceptualized in 2008 by John Sullivan
as criminal insurgency.56 This articulation has now
become the dominant one characterizing Mexican
cartel insurgent activities, due to the numerous publications—including many books—focusing on this
subject matter, vis-à-vis more traditional organized
crime perceptions.57 Such insurgencies are derived
from criminal enterprises competing with the state
not for political participation but to free themselves
from state regulation and control in the illicit economic sphere. As these organized criminal groups create
environmental conditions conducive to total “impunity” of action—via waging campaigns of violence
and subversion (by means of corruption) against the
public, state institutions, and competing organized
crime groups—contested and lawless zones result. As
Sullivan and Rosales have stated:
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The cartels may not seek a social or political agenda,
but once they control turf and territory and effectively
displace the state they have no choice—they become
‘accidental insurgents.’58

In addition to the cartels gaining de facto political control of local cities whose police forces, courts,
and governmental decisionmaking structures have
been co-opted, additional detrimental outcomes take
place. These include socio-cultural shifts via the rise of
narcocultura that, in essence, promote deviant values
and ways of living, the resocialization of the young to
embrace cartel over state loyalties, and even in some
instances an acceptance of criminal and dark forms of
spirituality. Additionally, given the predatory capitalist nature of the global illicit economy, cartel “parastate” areas have witnessed an expansion of criminality via extortion and street taxation, kidnapping, bulk
and resource theft, and associated activities.
The topic of spiritual insurgency was then resurrected by Matthew Lauder in a 2009 piece for the Canadian defense establishment. He credited Metz with
initially conceptualizing this insurgency form, but
then argued that this construct needed to be greatly
expanded by being more religiously grounded. This
form variant can be viewed as violent new religious
movements based:
It is, therefore, my intent to augment Metz’s conceptualisation of spiritual insurgency, and show that spiritual insurgencies are not secular-political constructs
with a (superficial) religious dimension, but rather violent new religious movements, guided by a religious
worldview and political-theology, that seek totalising
social transformation (in particular, the annihilation

25

of perceived religious adversaries) through the use of
divinely-sanctioned violence.59

Lauder then went on to develop nine themes, which
are common to spiritual insurgencies being conducted
by violent new religious movements:
1) That participants believe they have exclusive access
to the sacred and sacred knowledge (gnosis);
2) That participants see the outside world as both
illegitimate and corrupt;
3) That the world is dualistic in nature, divided into
the sacred and the profane, good and evil;
4) That salvation can only be achieved through the
elimination of evil and corrupting influences, and
that violence is necessary to (symbolically) cleanse the
world;
5) That violence is divinely-willed and sanctioned (i.e.,
God deems the use of violence, manifested as a holy
war, as necessary);
6) That the new social order (i.e., re-structured society)
is modelled on the sacred, usually in the form of an
idealised and mythical past;
7) That movements are informed and maintained by a
central prophetic character;
8) That participants see themselves as agents of the sacred and soldiers of God; and,
9) That the end state is the implementation of divinelaw (i.e., a politically theology), which guides all
thinking and behaviour.60
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Examples of these new movements include Aum
Shinrikyo, the Branch Davidians, the Christian Identity
Movement, and of course, al-Qaeda.61
In 2011, Charlie Tarr elaborated on the concept
of resource control insurgencies related to the case of
the Niger Delta with its great oil deposits. The work
highlights indigenous elite based petro-capitalism
and how local insurgent groups engage in “resource
war” as it relates to the larger “new war” paradigm
proposed by Mary Kaldor back in 1998.62 This blurring of the crime and war environments is indicative
of the context in which Metz’s much earlier commercial
insurgency construct, as later modified by John Sullivan’s criminal insurgency sub-typology, operates. In
2011, Robert C. Jones writing on insurgencies, as they
relate to Special Operations Command perceptions,
proposed three insurgency types with overlapping
combinations depending on the groups involved and
local conditions on the ground:
Insurgency is a natural response to critical perceptions within distinct and significant segments of the
populace and typically manifests in some combination of three broad categories of action: revolution,
separatism, and resistance. Most populaces perceive
their governance to be tolerably good, resulting in
generally stable conditions; however, as such perceptions degrade within distinct and significant segments
of the populace, the conditions of insurgency grow.
When this occurs it places ever increasing demands
on the government to either undergo evolution to address these concerns or increase their security capacity
to suppress the resultant illegal popular revolution. In
broadest terms there grows a fundamental desire for
liberty4 within a populace where perceptions of poor
governance produce conditions of insurgency. This is
true if the populace’s goals are revolutionary, to change
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some part or whole of the existing government (such
as the Afghan Taliban leadership in Pakistan or the
recent uprisings in North Africa); separatist, to break
some distinct region from the whole to form a new
state (such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, or Kurds
in Northern Iraq); or a resistance, to challenge some
foreign occupation (such as the rank and file Taliban
in Afghanistan).63

This categorization scheme is both interesting and
problematic from a typology form perspective because of the fuzzy nature of the combinations—as can
be seen with the differing Taliban leadership and rank
and file motivations above—and as a basic functional
form is devoid of religious or economic (greed) type
motivators which gives it a somewhat secular and
sanitized feel.64
Robert Bunker, in 2011, then developed the plutocratic insurgency form as a variation of Metz’s commercial insurgency articulation and a post-modern
counterpart to Sullivan’s concept of criminal insurgency. It is also related to John Robb’s view on the hollowing out of the state (2008), the Deviant Globalization
(2011) work of Nils Gilman et al., and the extensive
literature on the growing disparity of income between
the 1% (to the .001%) and the rest of the Western
social classes.65 Theoretically, this represented a missing component of epochal change model elements focusing on state deinstitutionalization during the transition to the post-modern era. This insurgency form
may be contentious due to the fact that “. . . it involves
global elites and lacks the traditional trappings of an
insurgency (i.e., an armed struggle).”66 As an insider
threat to the Westphalian state system, however, it leverages “the coercive force of the state” via the use of
lawyers, lobbyists, and campaign donations to create
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national laws and policies favorable to its global capitalism needs. This places it an odds with state moderated forms of capitalism, older middle class based
socio-economic patterns, and allows for the suppression of protests and dissent of the governed by means
of captured domestic policing and court structures. In
a 2015 essay on this insurgency form, Bunker identified such predatory capitalist activities as follows:
• Stress profit and equity gain at all costs;
• Follow the principles of hyper-rationalism;
• Show no loyalty to workers, supplies, customers,
or even nations;
•
Increasingly operate within a sovereign free
economy;
• Utilize corruption, co-option, and coercive force
as required; and,
• Have a willingness to profit from the informal,
and even illicit, economy.67
In that essay, Bunker went on to highlight the
growing power of multinational corporations and
global elites, to better define plutocratic insurgency
elements, and discussed the ongoing “public looting
for private gain” of what is becoming a new class of
supra-bourgeoisie transnational elites.
Digressing a couple of years to 2013, Seth Jones
and Patrick Johnson published an essay on the future
of insurgency. A component of this essay discussed
how “China could become increasingly involved in
supporting insurgencies and counterinsurgencies if
its economic and military power continues to increase
and its global interest expands.”68 This is one of the
first instances in which post-Maoist Chinese state linked
insurgency form potentials have been raised in the
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literature.69 The authors see Chinese involvement with
both insurgencies and counterinsurgencies plausible
within the next decade. Factors that could determine
this include the following:
(1) A continuing rise in its economic and military
power;
(2) An increase in its global interests;
(3) Limited power projection capabilities; and,
(4) Progress on its capabilities to support insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.70
Of course, added to these factors would be a forceful response to a more direct U.S. containment strategy
in the South-China Sea being imposed against it. Taking a different trajectory, in 2013 Michael Rectenwald
published “The Singularity and Socialism” that takes
us down corridors of singularity insurgency potentials.
The work is devoid of the typical science fiction angst
and looks at cyborg and artificial intelligence potentials linked to neo-Marxist thinking that, in a sense,
produces a new form of angst. The singularity or
“. . . the hypothetical, near-future point at which machine intelligence will presumably supersede human
intelligence, and when an intelligence explosion will
commence” will include the use of gene therapy and
computer prostheses implanted in human brains (e.g.,
wetware).71 Of concern to that author are the aims of
a “technocratic, ruling elite” utilizing such advanced
technologies for global human domination purposes.
Interestingly, such perceptions find some common
ground with the rogue globalized capitalism concerns
of Bunker—echoed by Gilman—as they relate to the
plutocratic insurgency form.
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Nils Gilman, in fact, in a 2015 foreword to a work
focusing on both the criminal and plutocratic insurgency forms, went on to highlight their interaction
within “The Twin Insurgency” construct tied to epochal change and deviant globalization strategic perceptions. The piece discusses the failures of social
modernism, the revolts of mainstream globalization’s
winners (the plutocrats) and deviant globalization’s
winners (the criminals) compressing the modern state
form between them, and the enclavization of microsovereignties and the end of the middle class.72
A newer work by David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, published in 2013, also needs to be singled out
for its theoretical impact. In this instance, Kilcullen
provides a second insurgency form contribution in addition to his earlier globalized Islamist (2004) one. This
one is focused on urban insurgency—one could even
say neo-urban insurgency—which views the urban environment as a system (e.g., a living thing) which exists in a certain symbiosis with insurgents, but can be
killed by means of botched counterinsurgent operations. Such megacity environments are vastly growing
in importance due to the megatrends of population
growth, urbanization, littoralization, and connectedness taking place and are likely to be the battlegrounds
of future conflict. Within these systems, informal networks are as, or even more, vital than the state due to
the establishment of a normative system. This system
yields predictable order for an indigenous population
and is established by non-state entities by means of
the process of competitive control.73
This conceptualization, while unique, builds
upon many works and appears to have been partially
inspired by a Small Wars Journal essay by John Sullivan and Adam Elkus. That essay, dating from 2009,
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focused on urban siege—highlighting the Mumbai
incident—as it relates to Richard Norton’s “feral city”
construct battling the military colony (e.g., military
urbanism) for dominance. Their approach to urban
insurgency is very post-modernistic—rather than urban left focused—and can be considered very much a
part of the new urban school thinking championed by
Kilcullen a few years later.74
Finally, the book, Wars from Within, published
in 2015 and edited by Albrecht Schnabel and Rohan
Gunaratna, provides a typology of three insurgency
forms. It is a revised and updated version of a limited
run 2006 book published in Singapore and is heavily
influenced by terrorism scholarship.75 As a result, it is
somewhat outside of the more traditional insurgency
literature, as was Rapoport’s work that was highlighted earlier in this monograph for its I&W utility. The
insurgency forms classified in the work are ethnic, religious, and ideological and are discussed in sequential
chapters by various contributing authors. Ethnic insurgency is viewed as one of the major forms of armed
conflict in the world and has the goal of either seeking
more autonomy or independence of a specific ethnic
homeland. Ethnonationalist groups highlighted include the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the more
commonly known Irish IRA and the Basque Euskadi
Ta Askatasuna (ETA). The religious insurgency form is
seen as a violent reaction to the threatened world order of a specific religion and considered defensive in
nature. While historical examples of both Jewish and
Christian groups are provided, this is predominantly
a modern radical Islamist manifestation, though contemporary Sikh and white racial purity extremist examples are included. A more extreme subset of this
insurgency form is messianic in nature. It is viewed as
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lacking legitimacy and, in a sense, composed of zealots drawing upon religious orthodoxy. The ideological
construct is based on revolutionary Marxist-Leninist
thought through Trotskyism and Maoism and into the
later 1960s and 1970s leftist terrorism. Groups identified as engaging in this form of insurgency include the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the
Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN), the Shining Path in Peru, and the Red Army Faction (RAF).76
PROPOSED INSURGENCY TYPOLOGY
Derived from combining the five terrorism waves
typology of Rapoport (and Kaplan) given its I&W
utility and the more encompassing review of the preceding body of insurgency literature focusing on typologies conceptualized by various theorists (Metz,
Clapham, Beckett, and O’Neill), a proposed typology
of old and new insurgency forms has been developed.
This proposed typology is divided into legacy, contemporary, and emergent and potential forms. An
overview of each insurgency form will be described
by means of a short paragraph description supported
by tables with form onset dates, group examples, and
the theorist and form (year of identification) that corresponds with them. The utility of creating this proposed typology schema is that it will allow for policy
and response recommendations to be made in subsequent sections of this monograph as they relate to the
strategic implications of these identified insurgency
forms and U.S. defense policy.
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LEGACY INSURGENCY FORMS
Four legacy insurgency forms have been identified
(See Table 1). For the most part, they relate to historical forms of insurgency that took place prior to and/
or during the Cold War. Still, the separatist form is not
totally defunct and the urban left form, while presently
defunct, has the potential to emerge once again. These
legacy forms are as follows:
Insurgency Form (Onset)

Group Examples

Theorists: Form (Year)

Anarchist (1880s)

Narodnaya Volya
Hunchaks
Young Bosnia
Serbian Black Hand
Black Cells
Black Hand (Germany)
17 November (Greece)
Black Bloc

Rapoport; Anarchism (2001)
O’Neill; Anarchist (2005)
Metz; State Destruction (2012)

Separatist—Internal and
External (1920s)

Irish Republican Army (IRA)
Irgun
Mau Mau
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación
Nacional (EZLN)
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)

Cable; Defensive (1993)
Clapham; Liberation, Separatist, Reform
(1998)
Beckett; Wars of National Liberation (2001)
Rapoport; Anti-Colonial (2001)
Metz and Millen; Liberation (2004)—with
limitations
O’Neill; Secessionist (2005)
Schnabel & Gunaratna; Ethnic (2006;
2015)
Jones; Separatist, Resistance (2011)

Maoist People’s (1930s)

Chinese Communists
Hukbalahap (Huks)
Vietcong
Shining Path
Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC)
Colombian National Liberation
Army (ELN)

Metz; People’s War (1993)
Beckett; Revolutionary Warfare (2001)
O’Neill; Egalitarian (2005)
Schnabel & Gunaratna; Ideological (2006;
2015)
Metz; Proto-State (2012)

Table 1. Legacy Insurgency Forms.
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Insurgency Form (Onset)
Urban Left (Late-1960s)

Group Examples
National Liberation Front (FLN)
(Precursor)
Weather Underground
Red Army Faction (RAF)
Red Brigades
Japanese Red Army
Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO)
Bolivarian Alliance (Potentials)

Theorists: Form (Year)
Metz; Urban Insurrection (1993)—
devoid of the Iranian experience
Beckett; Urban (2001)
Beckett; Superpower Based (2001)—
Soviet proxy component
Rapoport; New-Left (2001)
Schnabel & Gunaratna; Ideological (2006;
2015)

Table 1. Legacy Insurgency Forms. (cont.)
Anarchist (1880s). Generally violent, anarchism has
only been viewed as a form of terrorism (Rapoport,
2001), because the end state sought is governmental—
even state—destruction. No replacement government
or seizure of the state is being attempted nor is any
form of subversion or co-option of state institutions or
the parallel building of a shadow state taking place.
Still, O’Neill (2005) designates this as an insurgency
form and the insurgency outcome of state destruction exists in a later typology created by Metz (2012).77
Major historical anarchist terrorist events include the
assassinations of national leaders such as Tsar Alexander II (1881) and President McKinley (1901), and the
Haymarket Riot (1886), Barcelona Opera House (1893),
and Wall Street (1920) bombings. These incidents took
place roughly over a 3 decade period and then dramatically subsided. Present anarchist activities pale in
comparison and are typically event driven with protests at political conventions and financial summits,
which are quite common.78 Recent domestic examples
are the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) riots in
Seattle and at the 2000 Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Los Angeles in which Black Bloc anarchists engaged in street actions. Anarchist protests in
Europe—especially in Greece—used rocks, Molotov
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cocktails, and even green laser pointers against police
forces during violent street riots, and are ongoing in
the wake of Greek economic instability.
Separatist—Internal and External (1920s). This insurgency form encompasses both separation from local
authority—such as the original IRA gaining Irish independence from the United Kingdom in 1921—and the
separation from foreign authority as took place in numerous regions during the decolonial period after the
Second World War. Numerous theorists have identified this insurgency form, ranging from Cable’s (1993)
defensive articulation through a number of others into
Jones’s (2011) separatist and resistance types. Examples
of this form of insurgency have taken place with the
Irgun, a Zionist organization, operating in Palestine
during the 1930s and 1940s, the Mau Mau active in
Kenya in the 1950s, the Basque ETA off and on again
since the late-1960s, and the Zapatistas in Chiapas,
Mexico in the 1990s. A component of this form of insurgency is typically that of an ethnic grouping seeking to gain independence from the perceived domination of a larger, or at least dominant, ethnic grouping.
While seemingly on the wane, this insurgency form
has not become defunct. With the end of the decolonial period, this form of insurgency has shifted to incidents of separation from local authority within both
European states and former colonial ones, with the
conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Sudan representing recent examples.
Maoist People’s (1930s). The most identifiable insurgency form is derived from Mao Zedong’s principles
found in his 1937 work, On Guerrilla Warfare. This
form, also known as “people’s war,” utilizes peasant armies that are drawn upon for an integrated and
protracted politico-military phase strategy of even-
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tual state takeover. A shadow or proto-state is created
in parallel to the pre-existing one being targeted for
elimination. This form has been identified by Metz
(1993) as people’s war, by Beckett (2001) as revolutionary warfare, by O’Neill (2005) as egalitarian, and Schnabel and Gunaratna (2006; 2015) as ideological. This
approach was utilized by the Chinese communists in
the 1930s and 1940s and by the Vietcong primarily in
the 1960s. The Tet Offensive of January 1968 in South
Vietnam drew upon these tenets and represented a
large-scale systemic terrorist (e.g., disruptive) attack
on the government of the Republic of South Vietnam,
the United States, and their allied forces. It ultimately
destroyed the will of the American public, which subsequently and irrevocably turned against the U.S. war
effort. While this form of insurgency is now defunct,
it has morphed into the following form—just as the
rural guerrilla evolved over time into the urban guerrilla and later into the modern day terrorist.
Urban Left (Late-1960s). This insurgency form
has been identified by a number of theorists and, as
mentioned above, is a continuation of earlier Marxist
politico-military concepts with a more urbanized emphasis. Peasants no longer fight in the countryside or
surround cities—their successors now engage in terrorist tactical actions within them. Metz’s (1993) urban
insurrection—devoid the Iranian experience, Beckett’s
(2001) urban and superpower based Soviet proxy component, Rapoport’s (2001) new-left, and Schnabel and
Gunaratna’s (2006; 2015) ideological (which spans the
earlier Marxist form and this one) all address this
form. Groups involved in this type of insurgency include the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
founded in 1964, the Weather Underground in the
United States—which, in 1969, developed out of an
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element of the Students for a Democratic Society,—the
Red Army Faction (also known as the Baader-Meinhof
Gang) founded in Germany in 1970, the Red Brigades
founded in 1970 in Italy, and the Japanese Red Army
founded in 1971. This insurgency form is essentially
defunct. Even the PLO (and the Fatah faction), which
has quasi-statehood on the West Bank, has moved
beyond it and now has to contend with its own insurgency threat emanating from Hamas out of Gaza,
which itself is representative of the radical Islamist
form. Concerns over the resurrection of this insurgency form have existed for a decade now, however,
and have been focused on Chavez’s bolivarianismo and
envisioned “Super Insurgency” aimed at changing the
status quo in Latin America.79 These concerns have
more recently been raised by Douglas Farah as they
relate to the eight member Bolivarian Alliance supported by external powers such as China, Russia, and
others.80
A number of forms were identified in the literature review that can be considered “widowed” and
outside of the legacy typology. Metz’s Cuban-style focquismo (1993) form can be said to exist between the
Maoist people’s and urban left forms listed above. Metz
and Millens’s national (2004) form covers multiple insurgency forms that have been identified and is too
broad of a categorization scheme to be utilized. Finally, O’Neill’s reformist and preservationist (2005) forms
are only terrorism focused. The initial one is indicative of single issue policy groups and present racist
organizations (e.g., abortion and animal activists and
neo-Nazis). The latter form is status quo seeking and
specifically concerns ethnic and hate groups (e.g., the
KKK and the Ulster defense groups).
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CONTEMPORARY INSURGENCY FORMS
Four contemporary insurgency forms have been
identified (See Table 2). Two of these insurgency forms
represent politico-military threats (radical Islamist and
criminal), one form is beneficial to the promotion of
U.S. strategic interests (liberal democratic), and the final one represents the conflict between state moderated capitalism and predatory global capitalism now
taking place (plutocratic). They are as follows:
Insurgency Form (Onset)

Group Examples

Theorists: Form (Year)

Radical Islamist (1979)

Iranian Revolutionaries
Hezbollah
Shia Militias (Iraq)
Mujahideen
Taliban
al-Qaeda
Islamic State

Metz; Reactionary (1995)
Rapoport; Religious Extremism (2001)
Kilcullen; Globalized Islamist (2004)—
Sunni focus
O’Neill; Reactionary-Traditionalist
(2005)
Schnabel & Gunartna; Religious (2006;
2015)

Liberal Democratic (1989)

Contras (Precursor)
African National Congress
(ANC)
Free Syrian Army (FSA)
National Council of
Resistance Iran (NCRI)

Beckett; Superpower Based (2001)—
United States proxy component
O’Neill; Pluralist (2005)

Criminal (Early-2000s)

African Warlords
Colombian and Mexican
Cartels
Latin American Gangs
Ndrangheta (Italy)

Metz; Commercial (1993)
Clapham; Warlord (1998)
Sloan; Apolitical (1999)
Thom; Economic (1999)
Cilliers; Resource-Based (2000)
O’Neill; Commercial (2005)
Sullivan; Criminal (2008)
Tarr; Resource Control (2011)
Metz; Non-Political (2012)

Plutocratic (2008)

Global Elites (.001% to 1%)
Multinational Corporations

Metz; Commercial (1993)
Bunker; Plutocratic (2011)

Table 2. Contemporary Insurgency Forms.
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Radical Islamist (1979). The Islamic Revolution in
Iran in 1979 and the ensuing 444-day U.S. Embassy
hostage crisis ushered in a new insurgency form derived from the perception that mosque and state are
inexorably intertwined. The radical Islamist form has
two variants—one Shia and the other Sunni based—
and stems from the fact that Islam never underwent
a historical reformation that ushered in secular political thought and a separation of the spheres of church
(or mosque) and state. The Shia form was exported to
Southern Lebanon with the creation of Hezbollah in
the early-1980s from a cadre of Iranian Revolutionary
Guards sent to organize local resistance in reaction to
the 1982 Israeli occupation.81 Since that time, Hezbollah
has gone on to create a para-state in Southern Lebanon
and link up with the Shia diaspora in Western Africa
and Latin America for illicit revenue generation and
associated terrorist activities. Additionally, elements
of the Revolutionary Guards (and the al Quds intelligence branch) and Hezbollah are presently operating
in Iraq and Syria in coordination with their Shia and
Alawite allies, respectively. The Sunni component of
this insurgency form has transitioned through generations beginning with the Mujahideen battling the
Soviets in Afghanistan from 1979-1989, the establishment of al-Qaeda in the late-1980s and their initial
Western directed attacks and network expansion, the
rise of the Taliban in the mid-1990s, the 9/11 attacks
and massive U.S. boots on the ground and hunterkiller drone response, and the eventual contraction
of al-Qaeda and rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria and its ongoing network expansion as its likely
successor. Scholars recognizing this insurgency form
are Metz (1995) reactionary, Rapoport (2001) religious
extremism, Kilcullen (2004) globalized Islamist, O’Neill
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(2005) reactionary-traditionalist, and Schnabel and
Gunaratna (2006; 2015) religious.
Steven Metz has provided a dissenting view on this
insurgency form, suggesting that the term “radical” is
a Western construct that reflects a bias toward what it
considers “moderate”—i.e., essentially friendly to U.S.
groups. As a result, this insurgency form includes a
strange mixture of entities including the Islamic State,
the Taliban, various al-Qaeda franchises, and Hezbollah. He sees a typology form better aligned along the
continuums of sectarian (e.g., Sunni and Shia) and
traditional versus modernizing/reformist groups.82
The author’s intent concerning this form is to capture
the “religious component” of that type of insurgency—one the United States too often overlooks given
its Western secularized (e.g., post-Reformation) bias.
Further, it provides some of the conceptual linkage
to the blood cultist form that will be addressed later.
Still, the author would agree with Metz that this is a
macro-form articulation and presently more theoretical than practical in terms of the policy insights that it
may yield.
Liberal Democratic (1989). The removal of the Berlin
Wall in November 1989, the ensuing end to Communist rule in Eastern Europe thereafter, and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991
marked not only the end of the Cold War, but also the
power of pluralist uprisings as the Polish Solidarity
shipyard workers have shown. That liberal democracy could provide the basis for an insurgency form
has been noted by both Beckett (2001), as the American component of the Cold War superpower based conflict, and also later by O’Neill (2005), more specifically
within his pluralist form designation. The rise to power of the African National Congress (ANC) in South
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Africa in the early-1990s—which required it to engage
in a fair amount of violence and subversion in the
process—and the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) victories in the 2000 and 2006 Mexican presidential elections—which worked within the political system—are
both examples of pluralist political victories. Where
this form has become muddled is when democracy
has been “externally forced” on the population of a
state by means of military defeat rather than “internally acceded to” by means of an actual or threatened
insurgency. The conceptual origins of the military
defeat variant can be drawn back to the post-World
War II era in which the populations of the major belligerents—Japan and Germany (at least the Western
portion)—were socially re-engineered into liberal democracies by the United States. Decades later this provided a faulty conceptual blueprint for the assumed
post-conflict phases that would occur after the U.S.
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. In those phases, it
was assumed that the United States would once again
have the luxury of birthing new democracies. Nothing could be further from the truth, however, with
the radical Islamist form ever since repeatedly breaking out across wide swaths of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Further, the advance of liberal democracy has been
stalled in most of the 2010 Arab Spring states either
in the face of intransigent autocratic governments or
in the wake of post-authoritarian state control environments that have resulted in al-Qaeda, the Islamic
State, and related jihadist groups violently contesting
the establishment of any form of pluralist governance.
Criminal (Early-2000s). Elements and components
of this insurgency form have been projected and identified by numerous scholars: Metz’s (1993) commercial,
Clapham’s (1998) warlord, Sloan’s (1999) apolitical,
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Thom’s (1999) economic, Cilliers’s (2000) resource-based,
Tarr’s (2011) resource control, and Metz’s later (2012)
non-political. Of these various articulations, Sullivan’s
(2008) criminal designation—directly derived from
Metz’s 1993 perceptions—has become the dominant
one as it relates to the insurgent-like activities of the
gangs and cartels in Mexico and Latin America. These
groups include the third generation Mara Salvatrucha
(MS-13) and Eighteenth Street (Barrio 18, M-18) gangs
found in Central America as well as the various Mexican cartels, such as the Sinaloa Federation, Cártel de
Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), and Tijuana cartels.
While Mexican army troops were not deployed
until December 2006 by the Felipe Calderón administration to fight the cartels in substantial numbers, by
the early-2000s it was clear this insurgency form had
emerged—with the fielding of professionalized cartel
paramilitary units and the rampant corruption of local police forces throughout regions of that sovereign
state. The essence of this insurgency form is that it is
illicit economic rather than politically or religiously
driven. The activities of African warlords and the
Ndrangheta (organized criminals) in Italy also provide
further examples of this form. Illicit organizations
seeking impunity of action and freedom from governmental control ultimately become victims of their own
success, and as a result, find themselves in positions
of de facto political authority via their use of violence
and corruption to achieve their ends. The accumulation of economic and the coercive power by criminal
means ultimately translates into political power. It is
in some ways representative of early state-making in
Europe, when the families of local strongmen over
time acquired titles and legitimacy as they filled the
political and institutional voids that had been created
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coming out of the Medieval era. For this reason, this
insurgency form is ultimately indicative of transformation of war and epochal change perceptions.
Plutocratic (2008). Of all of the insurgency forms offered in this monograph, this may be one of the most
contentious. It specifically views the rise of globalized
capital devoid of any ties to the state—in essence,
representative of an emerging form of 21st century
postmodern capitalism—in direct conflict with earlier forms of 20th century state moderated capitalism
promoted by liberal democratic governments. It views
the rise of stateless multinational corporations, and
the global elites (.001% to 1%) they serve as the major
stakeholders, as insider insurgent threats to the international order. This insurgent form serves as a corollary to the preceding criminal form and represents another variant to Metz’s (1993) commercial articulation
postulated by Bunker (2011). In this case, however,
rather than being promoted by criminal outsiders and
have nots, this form is being promoted by the winners of globalization to maximize their profits even
more. It utilizes subversion and corruption by means
of lawyers and lobbyists aimed at democratically
elected officials and coercive force based on co-opted
elements of the state to shut down protests backed up
by private security forces serving as private enclave
protective details. It may ultimately result in making
the social contract between the citizen and the state as
meaningless as it has become between the citizen and
their private employer. Business risk and future costs
are increasingly being placed on the employee who is
being stripped of medical and retirement benefits and
are being utilized increasingly in contract and parttime positions. Trending toward this form began with
the Reagan-Thatcher revolution in the 1980s, but had
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not become clear until 2008 with the global nature of
the plutocratic insurgency—as seen with the ensuing
stock market crashes and bank bailouts—unmasking
it.83 An outcome of this insurgency form is the compression of the American middle class and an increasing bifurcation of the haves and have nots within
American society. Gilman’s “Twin Insurgency” construct later served to illustrate the interaction of this
insurgency form and the criminal one to the detriment
of Westphalian sovereignty and Western democratic
peoples.
The only insurgency form of significance not incorporated into the contemporary typology forms is
Metz’s state-destruction (2012) form that is utilized by
weak insurgents unable to seize territory. It would appear mostly associated with the criminal insurgency
form, but could also be conceivably utilized within
the radical Islamist and even the plutocratic forms under specific conditions. In the case of the latter, these
conditions would be to, a) gain resource and market
concessions from, or b) combat foreign industry nationalization by, an intransigent regime.
Additionally, current Russian operations in
Ukraine have an insurgent component within them
and must be considered. Still, this component is subordinated within the lager umbrella of Russian hybrid warfare. The sending of Russian troops into the
Ukraine without their uniforms—the “little green
men” that Putin calls local self-defense groups—is one
component of hybrid warfare. Another component is
paying indigenous organized crime groups to engage
in assassinations and street terrorism. Still another
is arming local ethnic Russian insurgents.84 The list
goes on with Russian cyberwarfare campaigns, European natural gas embargos, proposed money bailouts
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to Greece, and even the shaping of Western public
opinion via RT network, originally Russia Today,
news broadcasts. Hybrid warfare draws upon all attributes of coercive power—utilizing force, economics, and communication—to promote authoritarian
Russia state international agendas. For this reason,
Russian insurgent activity in the Ukraine is beyond
the scope of the insurgency forms identified in this
monograph.85
EMERGENT AND POTENTIAL INSURGENCY
FORMS
Two emergent and three potential insurgency
forms have been identified (See Table 3). The first
form, blood cultist, is increasingly becoming a concern
and is derived from cult-like behaviors. It is emerging to some extent in both contemporary radical Islamist and criminal insurgency environments. The
second form, neo-urban, is emerging and tied to the
breakdown of state control over some of the megacities of the world. The third form, virtual, has near to
midterm potential to develop and exists primarily in
cyberspace. The fourth, Chinese authoritarianism, also
has near to midterm potentials concerning its development, depending on where future U.S.-China relations may go. The final form, cyborg and spiritual machine, is set far in the future and is science fiction-like
in its potential for development—though it must still
be considered for the dangers it would represent to
democratic freedoms and pure strain (unenhanced)
humans themselves.86 These forms are as follows:
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Insurgency Form (Onset)

Group Examples

Theorists: Form (Year)

Blood Cultist (Emergent)

Khmer Rouge (Precursor)
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)
Los Zetas/Cartel del Golfo (Santa
Muerte)
La Familia
Los Caballeros Templarios
al-Qaeda in Iraq (al-Zarqawi cell)
Islamic State Components

Metz; Spiritual (1993) & Sullivan;
Criminal (2008) Combination
O’Neill; Apocalyptic-Utopian (2005)
Schnabel & Gunaratna; Religious—
Messianic subset (2006; 2015)
Kaplan; Utopian Vision (2007)
Lauder; Spiritual—as Violent New
Religious Movements (2009)

Neo-urban (Emergent)

Inner City Gangs
Local Militias
Organized Crime
Private Security Groups

Metz; Commercial (1993) & Metz;
Urban Insurrection (1993)
Combination
Sullivan & Elkus; Urban (2009)
Kilcullen; Urban (2013)

Virtual (Potential; Near to
Midterm)

Hacktivists
Online Vigilantes
Second Life Terrorists
Anonymous, GhostSec
al-Qaeda and Islamic State
adherents

Thomas; Virtual (2006)
Hammes; Virtual (2007)
Sloan; Virtual (2011)
Metz; State Destruction (2012)

Chinese Authoritarianism
(Potential; Near to Midterm)

People’s Republic of China (PRC)

Jones and Johnson; Chinese State
(2013)

Cyborg and Spiritual Machine
(Potential; Long Term/
Science Fiction)

Augmented/Enhanced Humans
(Wetware & Bio-implants)
Strong AI (Artificial Intelligence)

Metz; Spiritual (1993) & Bunker;
Plutocratic (2011) Combination
Rectenwald; Singularity (2013)

Table 3. Emergent and Potential Insurgency Forms.
Blood Cultist (Emergent). Insurgency forms derived
from any type of spiritual or religious underpinnings
are normally difficult for U.S. military thinkers and
operators to readily accept. Rather, the standard view
that secular motivators derived from power, money,
and criminality is dominant.87 Religion is viewed
as nothing more than a facade and a justification to
achieve such secular pursuits. This insurgency form
goes beyond religious motivations and takes us down
the path of cultish behaviors, utopian worlds, apocalyptic yearnings, and even instances of human sacrifice
to one or more gods for appeasement or dark-magic
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religious petition purposes. The existence of this type
of insurgency form has been recognized by a number
of scholars (O’Neill, 2005; Kaplan, 2007; and Lauder,
2009) primarily within the last decade and ultimately
represents a fusion of criminality, spirituality, and
barbarism. It is most recognizable with recent Islamic
State activity involving mass ritual beheadings, crucifixions, child rape, and related atrocities and their
“end of days” type of pursuits.88 Even the name of
the online IS magazine, Dabiq, refers to a prophesized
location in Syria where one of the apocalyptic battles
will be fought. Insurgent groups actively promoting
the coming of the Mahdi prior to the Day of Judgement in the Shia tradition of Islam also fall into this
typology. Attributes of this insurgency form can also
be found with La Familia Michoacana (LFM) and Los
Caballeros Templarios (The Knight’s Templars) cartels
in Mexico that engage in Christian cultish behaviors
and elements of Los Zetas and Cartel del Golfo that are
involved in extreme forms of Santa Muerte worship
which seek supernatural protection, death magic
spells, and power and riches. Since this insurgency
form is so extreme in nature, the number of active foot
soldiers it can be said to represent is still quite limited. However, youth indoctrination programs, such
as the IS “Cubs of the Caliphate” and recruitment of
child soldiers by Los Zetas (e.g., Baby-Zetas) suggest
that a ready supply of new blood cultist insurgents are
actively being brainwashed.89
Neo-urban (Emergent). This emergent insurgency
form is not a resurgence of the old urban left form dating back to the late-1960s derived from small numbers
of politicized leftist-leaning urban guerrillas. Rather,
this form is post-modernistic in orientation with concerns over feral cities and sprawling slums—such as
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in Karachi, Rio, Lagos, and Nairobi—controlled by
inner city gangs, local militias, organized crime and
private security groups. It is far more like Mike Davis,
Planet of Slums (2006), than Ridely Scott, Blade Runner (1982), and relatively devoid of higher technology influences. Theoretically, it can be considered a
kludge of Metz’s commercial (1993) and urban insurrection (1993) forms updated by means of Sullivan and
Elkus’s urban (2009) and Kilcullen’s urban (2013) focused insurgencies writings. Kilcullen’s competitive
control focus is further indicative of fractured sovereignty and state deconstruction. It is thus conceptually allied with the neo-Medievalism works of Hedley
Bull (1977), Jorg Friedrichs (2001), and Phil Williams
(2008).90 This insurgency form has become the focus
of present “megacities issue” studies by U.S. Army
insurgency experts and is highlighted by such works
as the Army Chief of Staff’s Strategic Studies Group/
Concept Team’s Megacities and the United States Army
(2014) and William Adamson’s “Megacities and the
US Army” published in Parameters (2015).91
Virtual (Potential; Near to Midterm). This potential
insurgency form is seeing operations being conducted
by hacktivists, online vigilantes, “Second Life” (virtual
game) terrorists, and “Anonymous” and “GhostSec”
members as well as al-Qaeda and Islamic State adherents and affinity members. Initial thinking on this
potential form solely focused on its being an adjunct
to physical based insurgency. It was simply viewed
as a means of virtual communications—a more efficient type of “propaganda of the deed” or cyber levée
en masse (form of mobilization)—which was initially
discussed by Thomas (2006 & 2007), Hammes (2007
in Metz), and Betz (2008) with some of these initial
components also touched upon earlier by Mackinley
(2005) and Cronin (2006).92 Additionally, Steven Metz
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sees the vigilante component of virtual insurgency as
a means to potentially punish the state for “perceived
misbehavior”—which conceptually can be linked to
his state destruction form identified in 2012 with links
back to patterns of anarchist behavior found with
Rapoport (2001) and O’Neill (2005).93 The initial “adjunct to physical insurgency” viewpoint has been challenged by new perceptions articulated by Sloan (2011).
Sloan sees the virtual realm as its own reality in which
insurgency can now be waged—a view shared by this
author given his past collaborative work with Sloan.
As a result, this potential insurgency form is reflective of a changing 21st century battlefield composed
of dual-dimensional space-time attributes, derived
from humanspace and cyberspace, with its increasing
virtual overlay placed over our physical reality. Further, this insurgency form may also be considered a
possible precursor to the potential cyborg and spiritual
machine form discussed later. Initial virtual insurgencies would be waged by humans, and increasingly by
expert and weak artificial intelligence systems, with
later and more mature cyberspace based insurgencies
waged by cyborgs and spiritual (strong artificial intelligence) based machines.
Chinese Authoritarianism (Potentials; Near to Midterm). China’s industrialization and rise to power is
reminiscent of the United States in the 1890s when
its military and political influence emerged as an outcome of its own industrial buildup and modernization.
With the closing of the American frontier, the predatory war against Spanish colonial possessions, and the
later circumnavigation of the globe by the Great White
Fleet, the United States was poised to take its place
with the world’s great powers. China is now not only
in the process of industrializing, but has been running
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a massive mercantilist-like trade surplus, and investing in countries across the world in order to gain access to raw materials and resources. In addition to
China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
and “Belt and Road” initiatives in Asia and within
the former lands traversed by the old Silk Road, it has
made significant political and economic investment
inroads into both Africa and Latin America.94 In retrospect, Chinese activity in Africa has been compared
to old school British colonialism. Enclaves of Chinese
nationals have been established along with economic
activities that extend beyond the formal economy
into informal and illicit activities for predatory capitalist purposes.95 The insurgency potentials of Jones
and Johnson (2013) can thus been seen vis-à-vis the
U.S. “Pivot to Asia” and the ensuing engagement and
containment strategy being directed at China.96 Any
number of issues related to Taiwanese independence,
local Hong Kong rights to self-governance, or SouthChina Sea claims and man-made fortified island-reef
construction could conceivably trigger direct military
tensions between China and the United States, because the United States would be required to fulfill
its treaty obligations in support of its allies. Blowback
from such tensions could readily result in the Chinese
promotion and support of local insurgencies in any
number of regions as a counter-move to what they
could construe as “hostile” U.S. actions in support of
a more encompassing containment strategy.97 An opposing view on such Chinese insurgency potential has
been voiced by Steven Metz. He opines that China is
now itself vulnerable to insurgency—possibly even
people’s war—since it has become ideologically bankrupt from a revolutionary perspective. Additionally,
he does not see basic anti-Americanism as a replace-
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ment ideology that China can utilize to solidify ties
to insurgent groups. For this reason, he is presently
skeptical that Chinese would potentially attempt to
promote some form of insurgency against the United
States in the future.98
Cyborg and Spiritual Machine (Potentials; Long Term/
Science Fiction-like). This insurgency form can be considered a “blue sky” scenario but must still must be
considered for its potentially dire implications. Further, debates over the ethics of use and the actual banning of “killer robots” utilizing varying levels of artificial intelligence are presently taking place along with
expressed concerns over the future enhancement of
humans with bio-implants and wetware.99 This insurgency form is derived from the merging of the spiritual
(Metz, 1993) and plutocratic (Bunker, 2011) forms and
has also been raised in neo-Marxist singularity form
thinking (Rectenwald, 2013). Such concerns have been
the lore of science fiction for decades and can be found
in Isaac Asimov’s “Three Laws of Robotics” meant to
protect humanity from such threats through the dystopian Terminator series in which the self-aware Skynet
computer system targets humanity for eradication.100
Such an insurgency form has the potential to develop
out of the “haves” of the world being augmented with
bio-implants and their human private security (e.g.,
mercenary) forces being upgraded with armed robots
with AI capabilities. While genetic and trans-genetic
human enhancement is not a required attribute of
this insurgency form, it is expected that it would be
an additional component of the augmentation of the
“haves” of the world. Some debate exists whether
such a future actually represents a threat to humanity
or if these are natural outcomes of the informational
and bio-technical revolutions taking place and that all
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human beings at some point will be augmented and
enhanced.101 From the perspective of contemporary
pure strain humans living in a democratic society,
however, such a future very much appears to represent a threat to our present liberties.
Metz, in recent correspondence with the author in
2015, raised the possibility that a radical Christian insurgency form could possibly develop. It could arise
out of areas wherein tensions between Christians and
Muslims are taking place, such as sub-Saharan Africa,
or in Latin America with some sort of politicized Pentecostal ideology fighting the power nexus between
the Catholic Church, the state, and the elite. Because
this is more of a “possibility“ observation rather than
an articulated form formally published in a professional or policy venue, it has been included for research purposes, but will not be included in the final
insurgency form listing.102
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR
U.S. DEFENSE POLICY
Derived from the insurgency forms identified, the
strategic implications of each form for U.S. defense
policy are as follows (See Table 4).
Anarchist (1880s). Strategic implications: None.
This legacy insurgency form is an anachronism with
the threat potentials downgraded to that of sporadic
periods of local unrest being generated by protesters
outside of political conventions and financial summits
and characterized by vandalism, aggravated assault,
and arson. This is solely a U.S. domestic law enforcement issue focusing on riot control, investigation
of criminal activities, and limited counterterrorism
response. No U.S. military response is required.
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Insurgency Form (Onset)

Status / Strategic Implications (DoD)

U.S. Response (Advocated)

Anarchist (1880s)

Legacy (Downgraded to
Sporadic Civil Unrest)
No Implications

Law Enforcement;
-Riot Control
-Counterterrorism
(Limited)

Separatist—Internal and External
(1920s)

Legacy (Sporadic)
Limited Implications

Varying Governmental Agencies;
-Situational Response

Maoist People’s (1930s)

Legacy (Defunct)
No Implications

---------------

Urban Left (Late-1960s)

Legacy (Defunct)
No Implications to Limited

Varying Governmental Agencies;
-Situational Response

Radical Islamist (1979)

Contemporary
Significant Implications
Grouping May Be Too Inclusive

Federal Law Enforcement and/or
Military Lead (All-of-Government)

Liberal Democratic (1989)

Contemporary
Mixed (Beneficial) Implications

Varying Governmental Agencies
-Indirect and Direct Facilitation Role

Criminal (Early-2000s)

Contemporary
Limited to Moderate Implications

Law Enforcement and/or Military Lead
(All-of-Government)

Plutocratic (2008)

Contemporary
No Present Implications

Varying Governmental Agencies
-Legal and Economic Focus
-Federal Law Enforcement

Blood Cultist

Emergent
Limited to Moderate Implications

Federal Law Enforcement and/or
Military Lead (All-of-Government)

Neo-urban

Emergent
Moderate to Significant Potentials

Law Enforcement and/or Military Lead
(All-of-Government)

Virtual

Potential; Near to Midterm
Initially Limited but
Increasing Overtime

Federal Law Enforcement and/or
Military Cyber Forces

Chinese Authoritarianism

Potential; Near to Midterm
Significant Implication
Potentials
Implementation Barriers Exist

Intelligence Community;
-Monitoring & Analysis
State & DoD;
-Behavioral and Environmental
Shaping

Cyborg and Spiritual Machine

Potential; Long
Term/Science Fiction-like
No Present Implications

Defense Science Board;
-Scientific Monitoring
-Environmental Shaping

Table 4. Insurgency Forms, Status, Strategic
Implications (DoD), and U.S. Response.
Separatist—Internal and External (1920s). Strategic implications: Limited. This insurgency form now
takes place only sporadically and to some extent has
been replaced by more traditional secession ballot

54

initiatives as have or may be seen in the future as taking place in Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders, and other
locales. Still, the insurgencies of the 1990s that took
place in the former Yugoslavia and the more recent
secession of South Sudan in 2011 suggest this legacy
form has not faded away. A possible U.S. military
response may be required depending on the specific
international incident taking place.
Maoist People’s (1930s). Strategic Implications:
None. This legacy insurgency form is defunct. No U.S.
military response is required
Urban Left (Late-1960s). Strategic implications:
None to limited. This legacy insurgency form appears
to be defunct, therefore, no U.S. military response is
required. However, the promotion by the Bolivarian
alliance of such potentials exists and could be facilitated by Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah, and/or Chinese support. Still, if this insurgency form should reappear, the impact is estimated to be limited. It would
require varying U.S. Government agency involvement
based on a situational response.
Radical Islamist (1979). Strategic implications: Significant. Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, both
Shia and Sunni forms of radical Islam have been promoting this insurgency form. Groups involved include
Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State. Of all the
presently active insurgency forms, this one most significantly impacts U.S. defense policy as witnessed by
years of recent deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq
and ongoing operations in Syria, Yemen, and numerous other locales. This insurgency form requires either
federal law enforcement or the military (typically) as
the designated lead. An all-of-government approach is
required to mitigate and defeat this insurgency form,
which presently possesses a radical Sunni terrorism
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component—utilizing both large scale and lone wolf
attacks—representing a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. Concern exists over this grouping of Islamist
entities being too inclusive.
Liberal Democratic (1989). Strategic implications:
Mixed (beneficial). This insurgency form should be
viewed as an opportunity to extend democratic values rather than as an actual or potential threat of some
sort to the United States or its allies. Varying U.S.
Government agencies may provide indirect and/or
direct facilitation of such insurgencies. The one downside of this insurgency form is unintended second
and third order effects—for example, U.S. support to
the mostly defunct Free Syrian Army (FSA) inadvertently strengthened the Islamic State (IS) by helping to
weaken the Assad regime.
Criminal (Early-2000s). Strategic implications: Limited to moderate. Typically, the groups involved in
this insurgency form—Colombian and Mexican cartels, Central American gangs, and the Italian mafia—
are viewed as a law enforcement concern. However,
some of the African warlords and the more operationally capable cartel groups, such as Los Zetas and CJNG
(Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación), have overmatch
capability to any law enforcement response.103 For the
United States, the response to this insurgency form requires either federal law enforcement (typically) or the
military as the designated lead. An all-of-government
approach is required to mitigate and defeat this insurgency form that springs out of Mexico and is bringing
corruption into U.S. border zones along with sporadic
incidents of narco-terrorism.
Plutocratic (2008). Strategic implications: None
presently. The U.S. military has no current role in the
response to the rise of predatory global capitalism
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and the emerging “sovereign free” entities engaging
in it. Rather, varying governmental agencies with a
legalistic and economic mandate will be required to
promote state moderated capitalist values and laws.
Federal law enforcement agencies will be tasked to
support such efforts as they relate to financial crimes,
tax avoidance, and related offenses.
Blood Cultist (Emergent). Strategic implications:
Limited to moderate. This insurgency form can be
viewed as a mutation of either radical Islam and/or
rampant criminality, as found in parts of Latin America and Africa, into dark spirituality based on cult-like
behaviors and activities involving rituals and even
human sacrifice. To respond to this insurgency form,
either federal law enforcement or the military will be
the designated lead depending on the specific international incident taking place. An all-of-government
approach will be required to mitigate and defeat this
insurgency form, which has terrorism (and narco-terrorism) elements that represent direct threats—especially concerning the Islamic State—to the U.S. homeland.
Neo-urban (Emergent). Strategic implications: Moderate to significant potentials. At its more benign
levels of criminality, this is a law enforcement concern, but at the point that public safety resources are
overwhelmed and internal stability is threatened, it
increasingly becomes a military concern. A major issue is governmental inability to effectively control
sprawling slums and the possible role of gangs, militias, and organized crime as a stabilizing and norm
inducing force. Of further concern is the fact that this
insurgency form readily has the capacity to merge
with the criminal insurgency form. An all-of-government approach is required for megacities which are
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in advanced stages of this insurgency form because it
ultimately signifies that urban competitive control has
shifted to informal networks and non-state entities.
Virtual (Potential; Near to Midterm). Strategic implications: Initially limited but increasing over time.
This potential insurgency form spans a basic criminal
or terrorist act (e.g., recruiting and fundraising for the
Islamic State) through increasing levels of sophistication, such as the release of classified governmental
documents (e.g., WikiLeaks), the shutdown of components of a state’s public and private infrastructure,
and actual destructive cyberattacks. Ultimately, it may
represent an entirely new component of insurgency
taking place both in cyberspace and eventually as a
component of dual-dimensional (e.g., humanspace
and cyberspace) operations. An initial response to virtual support of terrorists and insurgents will need to
come from federal law enforcement and specialized
computer forensic and cyber task forces. More systemic and malicious type attacks, approaching what
can be considered virtual insurgency levels, will result
in military and intelligence agency cyber forces also
being utilized for response purposes.
Chinese Authoritarianism (Potential; Near to Midterm). Strategic implications: Significant potentials.
Given that China is rising as a great power and now
has global economic and political interests and reach,
this proposed insurgency form could in the near to
midterm represent a threat to U.S. national security.
However, significant barriers to implementation exist stemming from a lack of a transnational ideology
that can solidify ties to insurgents. Ongoing monitoring and analysis by the intelligence community
of such threat potentials is warranted for strategic
early warning purposes. Additionally, behavioral and
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environmental shaping by the Department of State
and Department of Defense to promote desirable futures should be implemented.
Cyborg and Spiritual Machine (Potentials; Long Term/
Science Fiction-like). Strategic implications: None presently. This proposed insurgency form is viewed as
having long-term threat potentials, although it is presently science fiction-like in nature. The appropriate
U.S. response is Defense Science Board monitoring of
technologies related to cybernetic implants and strong
artificial intelligence and the shaping of policies and
laws that promote democratic and constitutional
values.
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APPENDIX
FOCUS

PRIMARY STRATEGY

TARGET IDENTITY

PRECIPITANT

SPECIAL
CHARACTERISTICS

Anarchists
1880s-1920s

Elite
assassinations
and bank
robberies

Primarily
European states

Failure/slowness
of political
reform

Developed basic
terrorism strategies
and rationales

Nationalist
1920s-1960s

Guerilla
attacks on
police and
military

European
empires

Post-1919
delegitimization
of empire

Increased
international support
(UN and diasporas)

New Left/Marxist
1960s-1990s

Hijackings,
kidnappings,
hostage taking

Governments
in general;
increasing focus on
the United States

Vietcong
successes

Increased
international
training/cooperation/
sponsorship

Religious
Extremism
1979-2020s

Suicide
bombings

United States, Israel,
and secular
regimes with
Muslim
populations

Iranian
revolution,
Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan

Casualty escalation,
decline in number
of terrorist groups

Utopian Vision
1990s-2030s

Rituals of rape and
killing, child soldiers,
use of narcotic drugs

Inward turning,
charismatic leaders
institute cult-based
behaviors

Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia prior to
victory

Further radicalize
and break away from
established terrorist
wave

Source: Modified from Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson,
“Looking for Waves of Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence,
Vol. 28, No. 1, 2009, pp. 28-41, that modeled David C. Rapoport,
“Modern Terror: The Four Waves,” in Audrey K. Cronin and
James M. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand
Strategy, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004,
pp. 46-73; with the addition of Jeffrey Kaplan, “The Fifth Wave:
The New Tribalism?” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19, Iss.
4, 2007, pp. 545-570.

Table 5. Rapoport’s (and Kaplan’s)
Five Waves of Terrorism.
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